



UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE | Electricity Policy
Research Group

E · S · R · C
ECONOMIC
& SOCIAL
RESEARCH
COUNCIL

EMR: carbon price floor, capacity mechanisms, EPS

David Newbery

**Meeting with Energy and Climate Change
Select Committee**

House of Commons 12 January 2011

<http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk>




- To de-risk and incentivise low-C investment
 - => CfD for contractual assurance
 - => C-price floor to underwrite wholesale price
 - ensures nuclear is not “subsidized”
 - => capacity payments - for peaking plant?
 - => EPS to deter unabated coal


To support £200 billion of investment by 2020

CO₂ prices are volatile and now too low

EUA price October 2004-December 2010



2050 projected CO2 price



Source: Committee on Climate Change, 2008 and 2009



Carbon price floor


- Needed because EUA price is volatile, too low and lacks longer-run credibility
 - undermined by 20-20-20 Directive and recession
 - to bring C-price up to sensible level
- => ensures wholesale electricity price adequate to support mature low-C investment aka nuclear
- GB wholesale price set by coal or gas + carbon
- => nuclear power will not then be subsidized




Design of Carbon floor

- *Ideally* reform ETS to ensure adequate rising C price applying to all member states
- Plan B: HMT's modified CCL from 1 Apr 2013
 - the proposal would levy CCL on carbon content to bring the ETS price up to a target level
- Objective is to ensure nuclear power (& on-shore wind?) is viable without extra support
 - other than the CfD to derisk and assure investment

Illustration of CCL rates over time to meet target CO₂ level



Projected levelised generation costs 2017 NOAK



D Newbery DECC 2011



Capacity mechanisms

- Capacity payment, obligation, auction or tender
 - or financial: reliability option

Issues:

- set centrally or decentralised bilateral market?
- For price (VOLL) or quantity (reserve margin)?
- market wide or targeted?

Aim is the assure security of supply, especially for peaking plant - peak spot prices hard to predict



Emissions performance standards

- Belt and braces to prevent unabated coal
- annual limit on CO₂ per kW *installed capacity*
- grandfathered for (financial) life of plant
- 600gm/kWh - consistent with supercritical CCS on 25% capacity
- or 450gm/kWh with CCS exemptions

already examined by Committee



- Carbon floor price: **necessary to support wholesale market and underwrite CfDs**
 - better to argue for EU carbon tax or equivalent
- Capacity mechanism **for security of supply**
 - needed for peaking plant?
- EPS - **to prevent unabated coal**

CfDs + carbon floor critical, others less so



Problems with C floor


- Imported electricity does not pay this C-tax
- Exported electricity does pay C tax
 - => distorts electricity trade at loss of HMT revenue
 - => not really a carbon correction tax but a support scheme for low-C generation investment in UK
- more complicated to levy than uniform C tax
- favour CHP and CCS? - *not* if correcting C price, *perhaps* if supporting investment

targeting complicates design

existing CCL on electricity will be retained along with 5% VAT - messy!


2030 target of £70/t “consistent with global target of 2° C” - would this underpin CfD?

Chart 5.A: Indicative carbon price support scenarios and baseline



Little difference across scenarios

Chart 5.C: Change in capacity mix compared with the baseline in 2030





Cost benefit analysis

Scenarios	Cost	Benefit	NPV £ bn (@3.5%)
1	£2.1	£4.4	£3.2
2	£6.2	£8.1	£1.9
3	£16.4	£14.6	-£1.7

Assumes all other policies unchanged

(post 2030 C price at £70/t?)

Ignores climate change benefits



Capacity mechanisms: Flaws in market design

- Bilateral, thin illiquid markets that stimulated extensive vertical integration
 - current design rules out pool & VOLL+LOLP
 - does it rule out PJM capacity auctions?
 - suggests centrally determined Ireland SEM model?
 - **Or reintroduce pool model: good idea anyway?**
 - DECC recognises possible adverse impacts
 - prefers targeted tender for last resort dispatch
- => negative NPV without higher VOLL**



Questions for Committee

- What will be the relationship between the time profile of the CfD strike price and the C floor?
- Why keep CCL on electricity? Argue for a derogation from EPD as CCL is an input tax?
- Why not adopt the US standard (wholesale) market design which gives liquidity, clear spot prices for CfDs, and better capacity options?

Make the strongest case to EU to reform ETS

CBA Cost benefit analysis

FOAK first of a kind (in UK??)

LOLP Loss of Load Probability

NOAK nth of a kind

NPV net present value (discounted at 3.5% real)


PJM Pennsylvania New Jersey Maryland (+) region

ROC Renewable Obligation Certificate

SMD Standard Market Design (as mandated for US markets)

VOLL Value of Lost Load (£9,999/MWh in balancing mech.)

Estimated levelised costs



Notes: Estimated levelised costs, assumes 2010 project start, 10% discount rate for all technologies. Ranges reflect high, central and low scenarios for fossil fuel and carbon prices and construction costs. FOAK is first of kind technology and NOAK is Nth of Kind. Coal ASC with FGD refers to advanced super critical coal plants with flue gas desulphurisation. Coal CCS refers to coal plants with carbon capture and storage.



Domestic electricity charges

- 2009 average domestic electricity bill £445/yr
 - Main environmental charge
 - EU Emissions trading scheme £24
 - Carbon Emissions Reduction Target £15
 - Community Energy Savings Programme £1
 - Renewables Obligation £12
 - Total (annual cost) = £52
- =11% of total bill
- Subsidy from VAT (5% not 20%) (£63)