EP 04

Tanga McDaniel, Karsten Neuhoff

Use of long-term auctions for network investment

EP 04  | Non-Technical Summary | PDF

Abstract: Short-term auctions for access to entry terminals of the British gas-network appear to successfully allocate scarce resources and capture scarcity rent. Now long-term auctions are being introduced to guide future capacity expansion decisions. In our model the fraction of rights issued in the long-term auction turns out to be a crucial design parameter. Even a `hypothetically` optimal parameter choice can in general only satisfy one of three aims: Unbiased provision of capacity, full revelation of private information and minimisation of distortions from network effects. The results suggest that long-term auctions for transmission capacity are not necessarily preferable to regulatory approved capacity expansion.

Keywords: Auctions, Gas, Investment, Networks, Regulation

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