Pass-through, profits and the political economy of regulation

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Felix Grey and Robert A. Ritz

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JEL Classification D43 (imperfect competition), H23 (environmental externalities & taxes), L51 (regulation), L92 (air transport), Q54 (climate)

Contact Robert Ritz – rar36@cam.ac.uk
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Felix Grey∗
Faculty of Economics &
Energy Policy Research Group
Cambridge University
fg313@cam.ac.uk

Robert A. Ritz
Judge Business School &
Energy Policy Research Group
Cambridge University
rar36@cam.ac.uk

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Abstract

Government regulation, such as the pricing of externalities, often raises the unit costs of regulated firms, and its impact on their profits is important to its political economy. We introduce a reduced-form model (“GLM”) that nests existing models of imperfect competition under weaker assumptions. We show how a firm’s cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation. We apply the GLM to carbon pricing for US airlines. We find large inter-firm heterogeneity in pass-through, even for a uniform cost shock. The GLM allows us to sidestep estimation of a consumer demand system, firm markups and conduct parameters. We derive the second-best emissions tax including lobbying a government “for sale”.

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1 Introduction

We present a new approach to estimating the impact of regulation on firms’ profits. It is based on a new reduced-form model of imperfect competition that unifies existing models using weaker assumptions. We apply the theory to understand the political economy of carbon pricing on the US airline industry, and quantify its winners and losers.

Government regulation often raises the production cost of regulated firms. In some cases, this is an explicit objective of regulation, for example, when it puts a price on an externality such as carbon emissions or uses an import tariffs to protect domestic producers. In other cases, it is an inevitable consequence of a broader policy objective; examples are minimum wage legislation and capital requirements for banks. In addition to their effects on social welfare, such regulations have an important impact on the profits of the firms being regulated.\(^1\)

This profit impact is critical to understanding the political economy of regulation. On the extensive margin, regulation that substantially lowers an industry’s profitability is often unlikely to be introduced. On the intensive margin, firms may lobby the government to influence the equilibrium level of the regulation enacted. The profit impact is also important, for obvious reasons, to the shareholders of any regulated firm. For instance, major central banks are now among those warning institutional investors about the risks to asset values arising from climate-change policy (Carney 2015).

Estimating this firm-level profit impact is, however, not straightforward. Regulation raises the cost of a regulated firm and may also affect, to different degrees, the costs of some or all of its competitors. In general, its profit impact will depend on the firm’s own production technology, the structure of demand, and its rivals’ responses. The last factor is particularly problematic because modeling it may require information on the identities of all firms, each of their production technologies, the nature of product differentiation, what variables the firms compete on, how competitive or collusive the market is, and so forth. Our aim here is to present an approach that radically simplifies this problem.

The first half of this paper introduces our “generalized linear model” of competition (GLM), in the spirit of an “aim to build the theory in such a way as to focus attention on those predictions which are robust across a range of model specifications which are deemed reasonable” (Sutton 2007, pp. 2305-2306). The GLM makes much weaker assumptions than typical models of imperfect competition. It assumes that (only) firm \(i\) is a cost-minimizer that takes input prices as given and operates a technology with linear production costs. The core assumption is that firm \(i\) follows a linear product-market strategy; in standard models, this corresponds to a linear supply schedule as implied by

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\(^1\)See Draca, Machin & Van Reenen (2011) for a recent study of the profit impacts of minimum wage legislation using UK data. In a distortion-free Modigliani-Miller world, the profit impact of bank capital regulation is zero; in practice, banking is characterized by imperfect competition alongside other market failures such as asymmetric information (Vives 2016).
its first-order condition. There are no assumptions on the consumer demand system, no assumptions on the technologies and strategies of firm $i$’s rivals, and no particular notion of “equilibrium”.\footnote{An implication is that we can leave open (i) how many competing firms/products there are in the market, and (ii) the extent to which firms’ products are substitutes or complements.} The GLM also allows firm $i$ to reduce its exposure to the regulated factor; under market-based environmental regulation, this is switching to cleaner inputs; faced with minimum-wage legislation, it is using less labour-intensive processes.

We use the GLM to characterize the impact of regulation that raises firm $i$’s unit cost and affects those of its rivals in an arbitrary way. In doing so, we allow for both “complete” regulation that covers an entire industry as well as “incomplete” regulation that exempts a subset of firms. We show how firm-specific cost pass-through, i.e., the fraction of $i$’s cost increase that is passed onto $i$’s price, is a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation.\footnote{We differ from the “firm-specific” rate of pass-through used in merger analysis (Ashenfelter, Ashmore, Baker & McKernan 1998); this asks how much of the cost saving achieved (only) by the merging firms is passed onto consumers. We also differ from a firm-specific pass-through rate based on a cost shock always incurred only by that firm. Our setting allows for arbitrary cost changes across firms.} That is, all relevant information on $i$’s demand and supply conditions is contained in this single metric. We show that higher pass-through implies a more favourable profit impact; a firm’s profit falls with tighter regulation if and only if its pass-through is below 100%. Up to this point, we treat pass-through as a parameter; it can be endogenized by assuming a particular mode of competition or estimated empirically.

To see the idea underlying the GLM, consider firm $i$ which competes à la Cournot in a differentiated-products market, with marginal cost $MC_i = c_i + \tau$ and a demand curve $p_i = \alpha - \beta x_i - \delta \sum_{j \neq i} x_j$ (with $\delta \leq \beta$). Make no assumptions on its rivals’ technologies or strategies. Firm $i$’s first-order condition for profit-maximization implies a linear supply schedule $x_i = \frac{1}{\beta}(p_i - c_i - \tau)$. Now suppose that regulation $\tau$ raises $i$’s own marginal cost by $d\tau$ and those of its rivals in an arbitrary way. How does this affect $i$’s profits? By construction, $i$’s pass-through rate $(dp_i/d\tau)/(dMC_i/d\tau)$ captures the impact on its profit margin $(p_i - MC_i)$. Moreover, due to the linear supply schedule, the change in its sales $x_i$ is proportional to this pass-through rate. Rivals’ cost shocks and competitive responses matter only insofar as they affect $i$’s price—but this is precisely what is captured in $i$’s pass-through rate. We show how to derive $i$’s profit impact in a way that does not require knowledge of the demand parameters ($\alpha, \beta, \delta$) or of $i$’s other costs $c_i$. This basic logic extends to a rich class of oligopoly models. The GLM’s structure nests, among others: Cournot-Nash, Stackelberg and conjectural-variation models (with linear demand); Bertrand and Cournot models with linear differentiated products; two-stage models such as Allaz & Vila (1993)’s model with forward contracting; a linear-symmetric version of the supply function equilibrium (Klemperer & Meyer 1989); behavioural theories of competition such as Al-Najjar, Baliga & Besanko (2008)’s model with sunk cost bias; and models with common ownership of firms (O’Brien & Salop 2000) which feature
in the current debate on the competitive impacts of institutional stock ownership (Azar, Schmalz & Tecu 2018).

While it is very intuitive, the critical role played by pass-through is also far from obvious. In influential work, Weyl & Fabinger (2013) show, in a general class of symmetric oligopoly models, that a *market-wide* rate of cost pass-through is a useful tool to understand market performance. As Miller, Osborne & Sheu (2017) write: “the effect on producer surplus [of a market-wide cost shock] depends on pass-through and a conduct parameter that equals the multiplicative product of firm margins and the elasticity of market demand”. By contrast, within the GLM, the firm-level profit impact depends *solely* on pass-through—no additional information about conduct parameter(s) is needed. This simplification of incidence analysis is the primary attraction of the GLM. On one hand, the GLM makes heavy use of the assumption that firm $i$ employs a linear product-market strategy; on the other hand, it allows for near-arbitrary heterogeneity across firms.

Our approach also differs from the structural modelling widely used in empirical industrial organization (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001; Reiss & Wolak 2007). By estimating a full set of primitives, structural models can be widely deployed to estimate merger impacts, the consumer value of new products, and so on. As Reiss and Wolak (2007, p. 39) put it: “The inferences that IO researchers draw about competition from price and quantity data rest on what researchers assume about demand, costs, and the nature of firms’ unobservable strategic interactions”.  

In this paper, we sidestep estimation of a differentiated-products demand system, make no assumptions about the precise mode of strategic interaction, and show how firm-specific pass-through is sufficient information to “close the model”.  

In our setting, pass-through therefore also captures the import of any departures from Nash and/or profit-maximizing behaviour. A drawback is that we are not able to perform counterfactual analysis.

The second half of the paper illustrates the utility of the theory. We estimate the profit impacts of (future) carbon pricing on the US aviation market. This setting is important in its own right: emissions from airline travel are projected grow well into the 21st century and economic regulation is likely as countries seek to implement internationally-agreed climate targets in a cost-effective manner. At our baseline carbon price of $50 per ton of carbon dioxide, the annual “value” of US domestic airline emissions exceeds $8 billion.  

Like many other industries, aviation is characterized by important heterogeneities  

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4A structural IO model has three ingredients: (i) the consumer demand system, often specified as a logit form; (ii) firms’ production technologies, often relying, like us, on linearity of costs; and (iii) the mode of competition, often chosen as Bertrand-Nash. It then estimates own- and cross-price elasticities of demand as well as the competitiveness of the market via firms’ first-order conditions.  

5Put differently, consider a market with $n$ firms. Structural IO modeling typically requires specification and estimation of $n$ demand equations as well as $n$ supply equations. With the GLM, we specify only $i$’s supply curve and show how $i$’s profit impact is fully captured by $i$’s pass-through rate—which contains all relevant information about the remaining $2n − 1$ model equations.  

6Our baseline $50/\text{tCO}_2$ carbon price is illustrative but close to central estimates of the social cost of carbon (Nordhaus, 2017). Our estimated profit impacts generally scale linearly with the carbon price.
between firms—in terms of demand, costs and conduct. First, airlines’ products are differentiated in terms of service quality, legroom, loyalty schemes, luggage allowances, and so on. Second, an airline’s costs depend on its aircraft fleet (e.g., size, age, fuel efficiency) and its configuration, both of which vary widely across carriers. As a result, airlines often incur heterogeneous cost shocks (on the same route) even when exposed to the same carbon price. Third, airlines operate different portfolios of routes (e.g., short-haul vs long-haul flights) and conduct across routes is heterogeneous at the airline-level (e.g., number of competing carriers, low-cost vs legacy carriers) and route-level (i.e., the same carrier competes differently on different routes). Hence it is difficult to know with confidence which specific model of competition is best suited to each individual route.

Leveraging the GLM, we estimate profit impacts while remaining agnostic about the precise mode of competition across routes. We have quarterly ticket price data for over 600 domestic US routes over the period 2002-15 (yielding over 30,000 observations). We have detailed information on fuel costs at the carrier-route level; we use variation in fuel prices to estimate fuel pass-through, from which we predict carbon cost pass-through. We obtain carrier-specific pass-through rates using Mean Group estimation (Pesaran & Smith 1995): this involves a separate regression for each carrier-route, thus allowing for heterogeneity both between carriers and within the product portfolio of each carrier. We then aggregate up to determine the overall profit impact of regulation for each airline.

Our results show large firm-level heterogeneity in pass-through rates. The large legacy carriers (Alaskan, American, Delta, Hawaiian, United and US Airways) have low pass-through of 55%, on average, across their routes. By contrast, the major low-cost carrier Southwest has a pass-through rate of 148%. Extrapolated to all US domestic routes, at a carbon price of $50/tCO₂, we predict a profit gain for Southwest of $0.5 billion and a combined profit loss of $1.5 billion for legacy carriers. Southwest’s gain is driven by higher profit margins plus market-share gains at the expense of less efficient rivals.

What explains pass-through heterogeneity? We decompose it into three parts: 62% of the difference arises due to different route portfolios: legacy carriers tend to fly longer routes which have lower pass-through; 26% is explained by Southwest using more fuel-efficient planes on the same routes; the final 12% can be traced to differences in customer demand. A key implication is that, because of demand-side asymmetries, there is heterogeneous pass-through even for a cost shock that hits all firms equally.

7Given the current absence of carbon pricing at the federal level in the US, other recent work, like us, relies on temporal variation in fuel costs—to proxy the impacts of future carbon pricing (e.g., Bushnell & Humber 2017; Miller, Osborne & Sheu 2017). For airlines, jet fuel costs are primarily driven by the global price of oil which an individual airline cannot influence.

8Pass-through above 100% is more readily interpretable in our setting than in other literature. First, we estimate pass-through rates (i.e., the $-price response to a $1 unit cost increase) rather than pass-through elasticities (i.e., the %-price response to a 1% unit cost increase) which are always lower. Second, our firm-specific cost pass-through reflects asymmetries in the cost shocks experienced by different firms; all else equal, a firm that experiences half the cost increase of a rival has pass-through twice as high.
We close with a novel application to the political economy of regulation. The GLM allows us to unite two different strands of literature: (1) an influential literature following Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which firms lobby the government over the strength of regulation and its policy is “for sale”; and (2) a classic literature following Buchanan (1969) on second-best emissions taxes in the presence of market power. The policymaker, cognizant of imperfect competition and under influence of lobbying, chooses her utility-maximizing level of regulation—which we call the “political equilibrium” tax.

Now assuming that the GLM holds for each firm, we show that equilibrium regulation in both models is determined by cost pass-through. The distortion away from the standard Pigouvian rule (emissions tax set at social marginal cost) is driven by industry profits: in (1), this drives the extent of lobbying; in (2), it effectively measures market power. The GLM tells us that firm-level pass-through pins down firm-level profit impacts—and so the industry-level analog is driven by a weighted average of pass-through rates across firms. This generalizes existing results on second-best emissions taxes (surveyed by Requate 2006) by allowing flexibility over the mode of competition, and clarifies the underlying economic intuition in terms of pass-through.

On the empirical side, with a $50/tCO_2$ social cost of carbon, our baseline estimate of the political-equilibrium tax is much lower at $19/tCO_2$. Average carbon cost pass-through is 78% so industry profits fall significantly with regulation. A decomposition shows that, of the $31 “shortfall”, around 90% is due to the Buchanan market-power distortion while the remaining 10% is due to Grossman-Helpman lobbying. The gains from weaker regulation accrue to the large legacy carriers. These findings suggest that the political economy for industries with strong product differentiation may be very different from well-researched sectors such as electricity and cement. They may also help explain why aviation has, so far, been a climate laggard.

**Plan for the paper.** Section 2 explains how this paper contributes to the literature. Section 3 sets out the GLM, relates it to existing oligopoly models, and derives our main result on pass-through as a sufficient statistic. Section 4 begins with brief background on climate-change policy for aviation, and then presents our empirical analysis of carbon pricing for the US airline industry. Section 5 contains our application to the “political equilibrium” level of regulation. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains (A) theoretical extensions to the GLM, (B) additional information on our airline data, (C) further details on our empirical results, and (D) extensive empirical robustness checks.

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9Conducting such welfare analysis requires a few more assumptions beyond those of the GLM, notably that consumers are utility-maximizers. By assumption, the policymaker does not have access to other instruments, such as a price control, to directly address the market-power distortion.
2 Related literature

This paper contributes to three other strands of literature. First, a rich literature has estimated cost pass-through in response to a variety of cost shocks, including excise taxes, input prices, and exchange rates.\textsuperscript{10} Empirical work typically reports a single rate of cost pass-through at the market-level. Depending on the detailed context, it finds evidence of “incomplete” pass-through below 100\% (e.g., De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal & Pavcnik 2016), “complete” 100\% pass-through (e.g., Fabra & Reguant 2014) as well as pass-through above 100\% (e.g., Miller, Osborne & Sheu 2017).

In this paper, we show the value of shifting attention to how pass-through behaves at the level of an individual firm. While prior work has emphasized large inter-industry heterogeneity in pass-through due to differences in competition, demand and technology (Ganapati, Shapiro & Walker 2017), our empirical results highlight significant intra-industry pass-through heterogeneity. We highlight, in the context of airline competition, that pass-through heterogeneity is driven by asymmetries in the cost shocks experienced by individual firms as well as asymmetries in terms of demand and conduct.\textsuperscript{11} In particular, we find that firms have different pass-through rates even for a uniform cost shock.

Market-wide pass-through has recently been actively used as a “bridge” between structural and reduced-form models (Weyl & Fabinger 2013; Atkin and Donaldson 2015; Bergquist 2017; Miller, Osborne & Sheu 2017). As explained above, the linearity of the GLM further simplifies this incidence analysis by showing how firm-specific pass-through then becomes a sufficient statistic.\textsuperscript{12}

Second, our paper adds to a growing environmental-economics literature that studies the impacts of emissions pricing on industry. This literature has so far mostly focused on markets with limited product differentiation: electricity and heavy industry such as cement and steel. A key theme is that the profit impacts of carbon pricing at the industry-level are typically modest; this has been found using several different modeling approaches: general equilibrium (Bovenberg & Goulder 2005), Cournot-style oligopoly (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz 2013) and event study (Bushnell, Chyong & Mansur 2014). A key driver is that a substantial portion of carbon costs is passed through to consumers in form of higher product prices. An important implication is that only a small fraction

\textsuperscript{10}See Weyl & Fabinger (2013) for a useful discussion of the diverse set of empirical pass-through results. In earlier theoretical work, Bulow & Pfeiderer (1983) derive pass-through for a monopolist while Anderson, de Palma & Kreider (2001) generalize this analysis to different oligopolistic environments.

\textsuperscript{11}Kim (2018) finds important asymmetries in pass-through rates in electricity generation where firms’ production technologies are differentially exposed to changes in the (input) price of natural gas.

\textsuperscript{12}Pass-through also plays a central role in the analysis of cartel damages. In particular, the “passing on” defense states that a plaintiff is not harmed by an upstream cartel overcharge to the extent that it is able to pass this onto its own customers further downstream. Verboven and van Dijk (2009) highlight the additional output-contraction effect that arises due to pass-through and further reduces a plaintiff’s profits. Our work shows that, for the class of oligopoly models within the GLM, the output-contraction effect is negative for any firm that does not fully pass on the cartel overcharge.
of allowances in a cap-and-trade scheme—typically covering no more than 20-30% of pre-regulation emissions—needs to be freely allocated in order to preserve industry profits (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz 2013). Any higher free allocation of emissions permits leads to “windfall profits” such that an industry actually benefits from carbon regulation.\(^{13}\)

Our paper extends this literature both in terms of the modeling approach and empirical findings. Our GLM-based analysis extends the theory to richer modes of imperfect competition, incorporating differentiated products and firm heterogeneity. Our empirical findings for airlines also differs from previous literature: because of the large losses incurred by legacy carriers (owing to low pass-through), the industry-level profit impact of carbon pricing is more significant. In particular, we find that the allowance allocation needed to preserve industry-wide profits is 43%—around twice as high as in prior literature. Thus, our results suggest that the political economy of carbon pricing for differentiated-products industries may be substantially different from the markets such as electricity on which the literature has focused to date.\(^{14}\)

Third, we contribute to the industrial-organization literature on competition in the airline industry. This literature has been primarily concerned with estimating the competitiveness of the industry and issues of market structure (Brander & Zhang 1990; Kim & Sengal 1993; Berry & Jia 2010); recent work has also highlighted differences between legacy and low-cost carriers and the special role played by Southwest (Goolsbee & Syver-son 2008; Ciliberto & Tamer 2009).

This paper finds new evidence showing that large heterogeneity across carriers also exists in terms of pass-through. We also provide the first, to our knowledge, formal economic assessment of future US climate regulation on this industry that highlights how different carriers have different incentives to influence this regulation.\(^{15}\)

Our empirical analysis uses an average ticket price across passengers for each carrier-route; our data are not rich enough to estimate the impacts of regulation on price dispersion (Borenstein & Rose 1994; Gerardi & Shapiro 2009).\(^{16}\)

\(^{13}\)Another strand of work examines the impacts of incomplete regulation in which only a subset of firms is subject to carbon pricing. This tends to worsen the profit impacts experienced by regulated firms and has important consequences for the efficiency and design of environmental regulation (Fowlie, Reguant & Ryan 2016). The GLM theory developed in this paper allows for such incomplete regulation, while our empirical application to airlines involves a setting in which regulation is complete.

\(^{14}\)Bushnell, Chyong & Mansur (2014) do not have estimates for airlines because their April 2006 event study pre-dates the inclusion of aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The period they study was still characterized by near-full free allocation of emissions permits, and this is a key factor driving their finding that firms benefit from a higher carbon price.

\(^{15}\)Another strand of the airlines literature focuses on the weak financial performance of the industry (Borenstein 2011), which includes most major legacy carriers going into bankruptcy over the last 20 years; there is evidence that such financial constraints can lead to price wars (Busse 2002). In an extension to our empirical analysis, we find that legacy carrier pass-through is 15% higher during periods of bankruptcy.

\(^{16}\)We present a simple extension to the GLM in which oligopolists engage in second-degree price discrimination, where early buyers pay less for their tickets (see Appendix A); we show that, in this setting, the profit impact of regulation is exactly as in our main analysis, with \(i\)'s pass-through defined in terms of the change in \(i\)'s average price.
3 The generalized linear model of competition

This section introduces a simple reduced-form model which we call the “generalized linear model” of competition (GLM). We developed the GLM to respond to Sutton’s (2007) call for industrial-organization economics to derive “predictions which are robust across a range of model specifications which are deemed reasonable.” We first set out and discuss the key features of the model and place it in the context of existing oligopoly models. We then derive our main result on the profit impact of regulation within the GLM.

As discussed in the introduction, we have in mind a regulation that leads to an increase in regulated firms’ unit costs. Examples are the government putting a price on an externality or imposing minimum wage legislation in the labour market. The following exposition applies to a range of different types of regulation. We place particular emphasis on the case of environmental regulation; in the following section we then apply the GLM to estimate the impacts of emissions pricing in the US airlines industry.

3.1 Setup of the GLM

Firm $i$ competes in an industry, selling an output quantity $x_i$ of its product at a price $p_i$. Let $e_i$ be one of the inputs that $i$ uses in production. Regulation imposes a price $\tau$ on each unit of this input $e_i$. The regulation may also apply to all (“complete regulation”), some or none of the other firms in the industry (“incomplete regulation”).

In the case of environmental regulation, the regulated factor corresponds to firm $i$’s emissions (e.g., of carbon dioxide); it is standard in the literature to view emissions as an input to production (Baumol & Oates 1988). Hence regulation corresponds to putting a price $\tau$ on the environmental externality.

In general, firm $i$’s profits can be written as $\Pi_i = p_i x_i - C_i(x_i, e_i) - \tau e_i$, where $p_i x_i$ is its sales revenue and its total costs are made up of its operating costs $C_i(x_i, e_i)$ plus its “regulatory costs” $\tau e_i$.

The GLM makes four assumptions about firm $i$ that are taken to hold over some interval $\tau \in [\underline{\tau}, \overline{\tau}]$ (with $\overline{\tau} \geq 0$):

A1. (Input price-taking) Firm $i$ takes input prices, including the regulation $\tau$, as given.

A1 is a standard assumption which is appropriate for many forms many forms of regulation including a tax on emissions.\textsuperscript{17} (Later on, in Section 5, we relax this assumption using a variation of the model in which firms, by making political contributions, can lobby the government over the extent of regulation.)

\textsuperscript{17}It is also a common assumption for a cap-and-trade system in which the market price of emissions is determined by way of an emissions cap. The reason is that an individual firm is typically relative to the size of the overall system, often because the system covers a wide range of sectors.
A2. (Cost-minimizing inputs) Firm $i$ chooses its inputs, including the regulated factor $e_i$, optimally so as to minimize its total costs $C_i(x_i, e_i) + \tau e_i$ of producing output $x_i$.

A2 is also a canonical assumption in microeconomic theory. For environmental regulation, it implies the textbook result that, at the optimum, the emissions price equals $i$’s marginal cost of reducing emissions, that is, $-\frac{\partial}{\partial e_i} C_i(x_i, e_i) = \tau$. With multiple regulated firms, this head turn means that the marginal cost of emissions reductions is equalized across firms, this yielding the well-known cost efficiency of market-based environmental regulation.

A3. (Constant returns to scale) Firm $i$’s optimized total costs faced with regulation $\tau$ are linear in output $C_i(x_i, e_i) + \tau e_i = k_i(\tau)x_i$, with unit cost $k_i(\tau) = c_i(\tau) + \tau z_i(\tau)$ where $c_i(\tau)$ is its per-unit operating cost and $z_i \equiv e_i/x_i$ is its regulatory intensity (use of regulated factor per unit of output).

A3 yields a production technology with constant returns to scale to operation. This is a more substantive assumption but also one that is common in the existing literature, including in pass-through analysis (Bulow & Pleiderer 1983; Anderson, de Palma & Kreider 2001; Weyl & Fabinger 2013), in the literature on environmental regulation under imperfect competition (Requate 2006; Fowlie, Reguant & Ryan 2016; Miller, Osborne & Sheu 2017) and in the analysis of the profit impacts of a minimum wage (Draca, Machin & Van Reenen 2011). A3 rules out, at least over the relevant range $\tau \in [\tau^*, \overline{\tau}]$, the presence of (binding) capacity constraints.

Combining A1–A3, standard production theory shows that, in response to tighter regulation, $z_i(\tau'') \leq z_i(\tau')$ and $c_i(\tau'') \geq c_i(\tau')$ (with $\tau'' > \tau'$). In other words, the firm reduces its use of the regulated input and instead uses more of other inputs; this saves on direct regulation-related costs but incurs higher unit costs on other inputs.\footnote{Given the constant-returns technology, we do not require any specific functional-form assumptions on the relationship between $z_i(\tau) \leq z_i(0)$ and $c_i(\tau) \geq c_i(0)$.} For environmental regulation, this represents emissions abatement: a lower emissions intensity $z_i(\tau'') \leq z_i(\tau')$ comes at a per-unit abatement cost $[c_i(\tau'') - c_i(\tau')]$.\footnote{The GLM’s abatement technology is consistent with standard properties from the literature. Write $i$’s operating costs as $C_i(x_i, e_i) = c_i(\tau)x_i$, where emissions $e_i$ are optimally chosen given output $x_i$; equivalently, the emissions intensity $z_i \equiv e_i/x_i$ is optimally chosen given output $x_i$. The first property is that emissions and output are complements: $\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} C_i(x_i, e_i) = c_i(\tau)$ and so, given $x_i$, higher $e_i$ implies higher $z_i$ and hence lower $c_i$, that is, $\frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial x_i \partial e_i}(x_i, e_i) < 0$. The second property is that abatement costs are convex: $\frac{\partial C_i}{\partial e_i} = \left[\frac{\partial C_i}{\partial z_i} \frac{\partial z_i}{\partial e_i} = \left[\left(\frac{\partial c_i}{\partial z_i} \frac{\partial \tau}{\partial z_i}\right)x_i(\tau) \frac{1}{x_i(\tau)} \frac{\partial c_i}{\partial \tau}\right] < 0$, and so $\frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial e_i^2} > 0$, for given $x_i$, requires $\frac{\partial}{\partial z_i} (\frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial e_i^2} / \frac{\partial z_i}{\partial e_i}) > 0$. The latter property is consistent with the GLM—but it is also not required for our main results.} Faced with minimum wage regulation, it is using less labour-intensive but more capital-intensive processes. If such factor substitution is infeasible or unprofitable then $z_i(\tau'') = z_i(\tau')$.\footnote{The former property is consistent with the following conditions: (1) emissions and output are substitutes: $\frac{\partial}{\partial x_i} C_i(x_i, e_i) > 0$, for given $e_i$, (2) abatement costs are concave: $\frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial e_i^2} < 0$, for given $x_i$, requires $\frac{\partial}{\partial e_i} (\frac{\partial^2 C_i}{\partial e_i^2} / \frac{\partial z_i}{\partial e_i}) < 0$. The latter property is consistent with the GLM—but it is also not required for our main results.}
A key implication is that, by the envelope theorem, \( \frac{dk_i(\tau)}{d\tau} = z_i(\tau) \), that is, firm \( i \)'s unit cost increase arising from a small tightening in regulation is given by its optimized regulatory intensity at that level of regulation. The increased costs due to input substitution are of second order at the optimum.

(While we focus on regulation that is effectively an input tax, the case of an output tax is simply nested where the regulatory intensity per unit of output \( z_i(\tau) \equiv 1 \).)

**A4. (Linear product market behaviour)** Firm \( i \)'s product market behaviour satisfies \( x_i(\tau) = \psi_i [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] \), where \( \psi_i > 0 \) is a constant and \( [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] > 0 \) is its profit margin.

\( A4 \) is the key feature of the GLM. It says that firm \( i \) behaves such that its output is in (fixed) proportion to the profit margin it achieves. The intuition is that a firm will sell more or price higher into a more attractive market, that is, its supply curve is (linearly) upward-sloping. As we show below, this feature is shared by a very wide range of existing models of imperfect competition with an underlying linear demand structure. In these models, given a linear demand structure, \( A4 \) corresponds to a linear supply schedule as implied by firm \( i \)'s first-order condition for profit-maximization. The substantive restriction here is that the proportionality factor \( \psi_i \) does not vary with the regulation \( \tau \). While regulation can shift firm \( i \)'s supply schedule it does not effect the slope of that schedule.

The GLM makes no assumptions on the technology or behaviour of firm \( i \)'s rivals. These firms need not be input price-takers (A1), need not choose inputs optimally (A2), have constant-returns technologies (A3) or employ a linear product-market strategy (A4). Regulation may also affect the set of \( i \)'s rivals, that is, induce new entry and/or exit.

The GLM also makes no assumptions on the demand system in the industry or on the nature of consumer behaviour. An implication is that we can leave open (i) how many competing products there are in the market, and (ii) the extent to which these rival products are substitutes or complements to \( i \)'s product.

Hence the GLM has no equilibrium concept; it does not necessarily restrict attention to a Nash equilibrium (or some variation thereof). In this sense, it is much more general than standard models in which all firms are Nash profit-maximizers. Moreover, \( A4 \) is consistent with “rule-of-thumb” behaviour by firm \( i \) that may itself not be profit-maximizing (though we do require cost-minimization as per A2).

### 3.2 Special cases of the GLM

To illustrate the scope of the GLM, we next set out some examples of well-known oligopoly models for which \( A4 \) is satisfied by all \( n \geq 2 \) firms in the industry. More precisely, given the input-price-taking and constant-returns-to-scale structure of A1–A3, each firm’s first-order condition yields a linear supply schedule that takes the form of A4. It will be clear
that the following listing is not exhaustive; other models with similar linear structures are also members of the GLM.

- **Cournot competition with a linear market demand curve** $p = \alpha - \beta \sum x_i$. It is easy to check that Nash behaviour implies $\psi_i = \beta^{-1} \ (\forall i)$. Including a firm-specific conjectural variation $v_i \equiv \left( \sum_{j \neq i} dx_j \right) / dx_i$ (Bresnahan 1989) leads to $\psi_i = [\beta(1+v_i)]^{-1}$, still consistent with the GLM. This also nests as a special case the linear Stackelberg model with multiple leaders and multiple followers (Daughety 1990).

- **Bertrand or Cournot competition with horizontal and/or vertical product differentiation.** Let firm $i$’s demand $p_i = \alpha_i - x_i - \delta \sum_{j \neq i} x_j$, where $\delta \in (0,1)$ is an inverse measure of horizontal differentiation and $\alpha_i \neq \alpha_j$ reflects vertical differentiation; this leads to $\psi_i = 1 \ (\forall i)$ for Cournot and correspondingly to $\psi_i = [1 + \delta(n - 2)] / [(1 - \delta)[1 + \delta(n - 1)]] \ (\forall i)$ for Bertrand (Häckner 2000). The latter is independent of $\tau$ as long as the set of active firms and degree of product heterogeneity are unaffected. A richer “semi-linear” demand system $p_i = \alpha_i - \beta_i x_i - f_i(x_1, ..., x_{j \neq i}, ..., x_n)$ remains part of the GLM, for any cross-price effects implied by the function $f_i(\cdot)$.

- **Two-stage model with forward contracting** (Allaz & Vila 1993). With linear demand $p = \alpha - \beta \sum x_i$, the subgame-perfect equilibrium features $\psi_i = (\beta/n)^{-1} \ (\forall i)$ (Ritz 2014); this is again independent of $\tau$ as long as $n$ is fixed. This modelling approach is widely used in the study of liberalized electricity markets (e.g., Bushnell, Mansur & Saravia 2008). The identical equilibrium also arises in the well-known two-stage model of managerial delegation (Fershtman & Judd 1987).

- **A linear version of supply function equilibrium** (Klemperer & Meyer 1989). Demand is linear $p = 1 - \sum x_i$ and firm $i$ has a linear supply schedule of the form $x_i = \sigma_i + \mu(p - k)$, where it chooses $\sigma_i$ and firms’ marginal costs are identical $k_i = k \ (\forall i)$ (Menezes & Quiggin 2012). Even though the strategy space has an affine supply function, the symmetric equilibrium features A4 with $\psi_i = [1 + (n - 1)\mu] \ (\forall i)$.

- **Competition with behavioural biases: misallocation of sunk costs** (Al-Najjar, Baliga & Besanko 2008). Firm $i$ maximizes accounting profits which erroneously include some of its fixed costs, at a rate of $s_i > 0$ per unit of output. Firms learn about

---

20Similarly, it is not difficult to check that spatial models of competition, such as Hotelling and Salop, can also be consistent with the GLM as long as the distribution of consumer valuations is uniform (which generates linear demand, and, given A1–A3, hence also A4).

21To be more precise, this involves a three-stage game: (1) the emissions price is determined; (2) firms engage in forward contracting; and (3) firms compete in the product market à la Cournot.

22We have modified the setup of Menezes & Quiggin (2012) slightly, by dropping their normalization of $\theta_i$ in terms of production costs, without affecting any of the conclusions. The equilibrium price in our specification is $p^* = (1 + nk [1 + (n - 1)\mu]) / (1 + n [1 + (n - 1)\mu])$, which tends to the Cournot solution as $\mu \to 0$ and to the Bertrand Paradox as $\mu \to \infty$. 
the impacts of costing in a “distortion game”. With differentiated Bertrand competition with linear demand $D_i = a - bp_i + g\sum_{j\neq i}P_j$, the first-order conditions feature a constant $\psi_i > 0$ (identical across firms), where $s_i = s^* > 0$ in symmetric equilibrium.\footnote{Specifically, using the results in Section 5 of Al-Najjar, Baliga & Besanko (2008), $\psi_i = [b/(2b + g)][b(1 + g/[2b - (n - 1)g]) - (n - 1)g^2/[2b - (n - 1)g]]$.}

- **Linear competition with common ownership between firms (O’Brien and Salop 2000).** If the shareholders of firm $i$ also own a fraction $\omega_i$ of its rival firm $j$, then the incentives of $i$’s managers will be to maximize $\Pi_i + \omega_i\Pi_j$. The implications of such shareholder diversification have recently received attention for US airlines (Azar, Schmalz & Tecu 2018) and several other industries. With Cournot competition, linear demand, and assuming symmetry, this yields $\psi_i = [\beta(1 + \omega)]^{-1} (\forall i)$.

The GLM is distinct from classes of oligopoly models which are aggregative games (Corchón 1994; Acemoglu & Jensen 2013) or potential games (Monderer & Shapley 1996). Cournot-Nash competition with linear market demand $p = \alpha - \beta \sum i x_i$ is an aggregative game, a potential game and also a member of the GLM. However, with differentiated-products demand for firm $i$ of $p_i = \alpha - \beta_i x_i - \sum_{j\neq i} \delta_{ij} x_j$, it is no longer aggregative nor a potential game but still yields A4 and thus remains within the GLM.

The GLM is more flexible than standard models along important dimensions. First, firms within the GLM may think they are playing a different game. Second, they may be using different choice variables (e.g. one firm chooses price and another firm chooses quantity). Third, the GLM, by allowing $\psi_i$ to vary across firms, does not impose that a firm with a higher market share necessarily has a higher profit margin. This feature is “baked in” to many standard oligopoly models via the restriction $\psi_i = \psi (\forall i)$.

### 3.3 Profit-neutrality technique

We wish to quantify the impact of regulation $\tau$ on firm $i$’s profits $\Pi_i$, and now use a simple modelling device to pin this down. Suppose that the extent of regulation rises from initial level $\tau$ to a higher $\bar{\tau}$. Of particular interest are the special cases in which (i) a new regulation is introduced, that is, $\tau \equiv 0$, and (ii) regulation is tightened by a small amount, that is, $(\bar{\tau} - \tau) \to 0$.

Let $\Pi_i(\tau)$ denote firm $i$'s profits as a function of regulation, and similarly $e_i(\tau)$ is the quantity of the regulated factor. Observe that $(\bar{\tau} - \tau)e_i(\tau)$ is the (incremental) cost of regulation associated with firm $i$’s initial quantity of the regulated factor.

Now define a profit-neutrality factor $\gamma_i$ for firm $i$ such that:

$$\Pi_i(\tau) + \gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})(\bar{\tau} - \tau)e_i(\tau) \equiv \Pi_i(\bar{\tau}).$$

\footnote{Specifically, using the results in Section 5 of Al-Najjar, Baliga & Besanko (2008), $\psi_i = [b/(2b + g)][b(1 + g/[2b - (n - 1)g]) - (n - 1)g^2/[2b - (n - 1)g]]$.}
In other words, $\gamma_i$ is constructed such that firm $i$’s profits under tighter regulation plus “compensation” of $\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau}) = \Pi_i(\tau) - \Pi_i(\overline{\tau})$ are equal to its initial profits under weaker regulation. Hence the change in firm $i$’s profits equals $\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \tau_0) \equiv [\Pi_i(\tau) - \Pi_i(\tau_0)] = -\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau})(\tau - \overline{\tau})e_i(\tau)$, so that $\text{sign}\{-\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \tau_0)\} = \text{sign}\{\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau})\}$. If firm $i$ does not respond to the tightening of regulation in any way, and its rivals do not respond either, then its profits simply fall as implied by its initial exposure, $\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \tau_0) = -(\tau - \tau_0)e_i(\tau)$ or, equivalently, $\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau}) = 1$.

The profit impact is therefore determined by three components: the extent of regulatory tightening $(\tau - \overline{\tau})$, firm $i$’s initial exposure $e_i(\tau)$, and the profit-neutrality factor $\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau})$. As is standard, we take the first component as given (at least until Section 6). The second component is typically available to policymakers and analysts dealing with regulation. For example, information on the historical emissions of to-be-regulated firms is collected in the run-up to environmental initiatives. The remainder of our theoretical analysis therefore focuses on determining the final component: firm $i$’s profit-neutrality factor $\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau})$.

### 3.4 Main result on the profit impact of regulation

We next present our main result on the magnitude of $\gamma_i(\tau, \overline{\tau})$ within the GLM. We will see that cost pass-through plays a central role for the profit impact of regulation. Define firm $i$’s marginal rate of cost pass-through as:

$$\rho_i(\tau) \equiv \frac{dp_i(\tau)/d\tau}{dk_i(\tau)/d\tau}.$$  \hfill (2)

The denominator captures by how much $i$’s optimal unit cost $k_i(\tau)$ responds to a small tightening in regulation; as explained above, given A1–A3, the envelope theorem implies $dk_i(\tau)/d\tau = z_i(\tau)$. The numerator captures by how much $i$’s product price changes. This will, in general be driven by a combination of $i$’s own cost increase as well as the cost increases and product-market behaviour of $i$’s rivals. Indeed, in standard oligopoly models, $i$’s equilibrium price is a function of the marginal cost of all $n \geq 2$ firms, $p_i(k_1(\tau),...,k_i(\tau),...k_n(\tau))$. Therefore the price-response $dp_i(\tau)/d\tau$ also captures any relevant changes in these costs. (Note that the GLM does not imply that this pricing function $p_i(k_1(\tau),...,k_i(\tau),...k_n(\tau))$ is necessarily linear in its arguments.)

Our firm-specific pass-through rate thus reflects the impact of regulation on all players, including any cost heterogeneity across firms. It is distinct from the market-wide pass-through rate considered in much of the literature pass-through (see especially Weyl & Fabinger 2013), for which each firm’s cost rises by a uniform amount. (If both demand and costs are symmetric across firms, and A1–A4 apply to all firms, then our measure of pass-through typically coincides with market-wide pass-through.)
Let \( \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \equiv \frac{1}{(\tau-\bar{\tau})} \int_{s=\bar{\tau}}^{\tau} [\rho_i(s)] \, ds \) denote \( i \)'s average rate of cost pass-through over the interval \( \tau \in [\bar{\tau}, \tau] \). We thus obtain our main result:

**Proposition 1** In the GLM defined by A1–A4, the profit impact on firm \( i \) of regulation \( \tau \) tightening from \( \bar{\tau} \) to \( \tau \) satisfies \( \Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \equiv -\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})(\tau - \bar{\tau})e_i(\bar{\tau}) \) where:

(a) if \( \tau - \bar{\tau} \) is small, then \( \gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \simeq 2[1 - \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})] \), where \( \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \simeq \rho_i(\bar{\tau}) \);

(b) in general, \( \gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \leq \max\{2[1 - \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})], 0\} \).

**Proof.** The proof begins by deriving a general expression for the profit impact, and then shows parts (a) and (b) of the result. In general, using A1, firm \( i \)'s optimum profit as a function of regulation \( \tau \) is \( \Pi_i(\tau) = p_i(\tau)x_i(\tau) - C_i(x_i(\tau), e_i(\tau))(\tau - e_i(\tau)). \) Using A2 and A3, \( [C_i(x_i(\tau), e_i(\tau)) + \tau e_i(\tau)] = k_i(\tau)x_i(\tau) \) so this simplifies to \( \Pi_i(\tau) = [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]x_i(\tau) \). Using A4, this becomes \( \Pi_i(\tau) = \psi_i[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]^2 \).

For part (a), note that the profit-neutrality factor from (1) can be written as:

\[
\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) = \frac{1}{e_i(\bar{\tau})} \left[ -\frac{\Pi_i(\tau) - \Pi_i(\bar{\tau})}{(\tau - \bar{\tau})} \right] = \frac{1}{e_i(\bar{\tau})} \left[ -\frac{\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})}{(\tau - \bar{\tau})} \right].
\]

Therefore, for small values of \( \tau - \bar{\tau} \):

\[
\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})\big|_{\tau\to\bar{\tau}} = \frac{1}{e_i(\bar{\tau})} \left( -\frac{d \Pi_i(\tau)}{d \tau} \bigg|_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} \right).
\]

Differentiation of the profit function \( \Pi_i(\tau) = \psi_i[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]^2 \) yields:

\[
\frac{d \Pi_i(\tau)}{d \tau} \bigg|_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} = 2\psi_i[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] \left( \frac{dp_i(\tau)}{d \tau} \bigg|_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} - \frac{dk_i(\tau)}{d \tau} \bigg|_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} \right).
\]

By the definition of (2), marginal pass-through \( \rho_i(\bar{\tau}) = [dp_i(\tau)/d \tau]_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} / [dk_i(\tau)/d \tau]_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} \) and also by definition \( i \)'s quantity of the regulated factor equals its output times its regulatory intensity, \( e_i(\bar{\tau}) = z_i(x_i(\bar{\tau})) \). By A1–A3 and the envelope theorem, \( [dk_i(\tau)/d \tau]_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} = z_i(\bar{\tau}) \) and, by A4, \( x_i(\bar{\tau}) = \psi_i[p_i(\bar{\tau}) - k_i(\bar{\tau})] \). So \( [\Delta \Pi_i/d \tau]_{\tau=\bar{\tau}} = 2e_i(\bar{\tau})[\rho_i(\bar{\tau}) - 1] \). Combining results, it follows that, for small values of \( \tau - \bar{\tau} \):

\[
\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \simeq \gamma_i(\tau, \bar{\tau})\big|_{\tau\to\bar{\tau}} = 2[1 - \rho_i(\bar{\tau})],
\]

where, locally, marginal pass-through approximately equals average pass-through, \( \rho_i(\bar{\tau}) \simeq \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \).

For part (b), the change in profits \( \Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) = \psi_i \{[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]^2 - [p_i(\bar{\tau}) - k_i(\bar{\tau})]^2 \} \). Defining \( \Delta p_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \equiv [p_i(\tau) - p_i(\bar{\tau})] \) and \( \Delta k_i(\tau, \bar{\tau}) \equiv [k_i(\tau) - k_i(\bar{\tau})] \) and expanding and
simplifying yields:

$$\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \psi_i \left\{ 2 [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] [\Delta p_i(\tau, \bar{z}) - \Delta k_i(\tau, \bar{z})] + [\Delta p_i(\tau, \bar{z}) - \Delta k_i(\tau, \bar{z})]^2 \right\}. \quad (4)$$

Recalling that $dk_i(\tau)/d\tau = z_i(\tau)$, it follows that $\Delta k_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} z_i(s) ds$. This in conjunction with (2) gives $\Delta p_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} \rho_i(s) z_i(s) ds$ and so $\Delta p_i(\tau, \bar{z}) - \Delta k_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} z_i(s)[\rho_i(s) - 1] ds$. Using these expressions and $e_i(\bar{z}) = z_i(\bar{z})x_i(\bar{z})$ in the profit-neutrality factor from (1) gives:

$$\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \frac{\psi_i \left\{ 2 [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] \left[ \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} [1 - \rho_i(s)] z_i(s) ds \right] - \left[ \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} [1 - \rho_i(s)] z_i(s) ds \right]^2 \right\}}{(\tau - \bar{z}) z_i(\bar{z}) x_i(\bar{z})}.$$  

From A4, $x_i(\bar{z}) = \psi_i [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]$ and some rearranging gives a general expression for the profit impact:

$$\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = 2 \left[ \frac{1}{(\tau - \bar{z})} \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} z_i(s) (1 - \rho_i(s)) ds \right] - \frac{(\tau - \bar{z}) z_i(\bar{z})}{[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau) \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} z_i(s) (1 - \rho_i(s)) ds \right]^2}.$$  

Observe that the profit-neutrality factor is bounded above according to:

$$\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{z}) \leq 2 \left[ \frac{1}{(\tau - \bar{z})} \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} z_i(s) (1 - \rho_i(s)) ds \right],$$  

where $z_i(s) \leq z_i(\bar{z})$ for all $s \in [\tau, \bar{z}]$ given A1–A3. There are two cases. If $\rho_i(s) > 1$, then $[z_i(s)/z_i(\bar{z})] [1 - \rho_i(s)] < 0$. If $\rho_i(s) \leq 1$, then $0 < [z_i(s)/z_i(\bar{z})] [1 - \rho_i(s)] \leq [1 - \rho_i(s)]$. Therefore, whatever the value of $\rho_i(s)$, $[z_i(s)/z_i(\bar{z})] [1 - \rho_i(s)] \leq \max\{0, [1 - \rho_i(s)]\}$. It follows that $\gamma_i(\tau, \bar{z}) \leq \max\{0, 2[1 - \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{z})]\}$, where average pass-through $\bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{z}) = \frac{1}{(\tau - \bar{z})} \int_{s=\tau}^{\tau} \rho_i(s) ds$, as claimed.  

Proposition 1 gives a very simple expression that makes precise how firm $i$’s rate of cost pass-through alone is a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation. It holds across all models that are part of the GLM. Conditional on the extent of regulation and firm $i$’s “historical” use of the regulated factor, pass-through is the only thing that matters: $\Delta \Pi_i(\tau, \bar{z}) \simeq 2 [1 - \bar{p}_i(\tau, \bar{z})] [(\tau - \bar{z}) e_i(\bar{z})].$

Firm $i$’s pass-through rate captures all relevant information on the production technologies of $i$’s rivals, the degree of product differentiation, what variables the firms compete on, how competitive or collusive the market is, any entry or exit by rivals, and so on. Whatever their other differences, if any two theories within the GLM imply identical pass-through for firm $i$, then they also imply an identical profit impact.

For a “small” regulatory tightening in part (a), this argument holds exactly; for a “large” regulation in part (b), the profit impact is bounded above by the same expression.
What is the intuition for the result? The profit impact is made up of two effects: that on \( i \)’s profit margin and that on its sales. The first role of \( i \)’s pass-through rate is that, by construction, it captures the impact of regulation on its own profit margin. Its second role is that, due to the linear supply schedule given by A4, the change in its sales is proportional to its pass-through rate. Rivals’ cost shocks and competitive responses matter only insofar as they affect \( i \)’s price—but this is precisely what is captured in \( i \)’s pass-through rate. These two roles are what drives \( \gamma_i(\tau, \tau_0) \simeq 2[1 - \rho_i(\tau, \tau_0)] \)

Two corollaries are immediate. First, pass-through signs the profit impact: \( i \)’s profits fall whenever pass-through is incomplete, \( \text{sign}(\Delta \Pi_i) = \text{sign}(\rho_i - 1) \). In such cases, the firm’s profit margin shrinks and, by A4, it also experiences weaker sales. Conversely, with pass-through above 100%, the firm benefits from tighter regulation: both its profit margin and sales volume rise.\(^{24}\) Second, all else equal, a lower rate of pass-through implies that regulation has a worse profit impact.

From an empirical perspective, the crucial feature of the result is that the profit impact \( \Delta \Pi_i(\tau) \) is independent of the proportionality term \( \psi_i \) from A4. As we have seen, different theories of imperfect competition within the GLM differ in terms of the their implied \( \psi_i \). Yet Proposition 1 tells us that this does not matter for the profit impact. The reason is scaling: by A4, the level of \( x_i(\tau) = \psi_i [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] \) and the change \( \Delta x_i(\tau) = \psi_i [\Delta p_i(\tau) - \Delta k_i(\tau)] \) are both proportional to \( \psi_i \). But the corresponding use of the regulatory factor \( e_i(\tau) = \psi_i z_i(\tau) [p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] \) is also proportional to \( \psi_i \). This means that the profit impact per unit of the regulatory factor \( e_i(\tau) \), as incorporated into \( \gamma_i(\tau, \tau_0) \), does not depend on \( \psi_i \). This is also one reason for why Proposition 1 applies without requiring information about own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand.

Of course, industry characteristics such as the degree of product differentiation are likely to affect the pass-through rate \( \rho_i \)—so they can certainly matter indirectly for \( \Delta \Pi_i \). The point of Proposition 1, is that, even if they also affect \( i \)’s supply behaviour, via A4’s proportionality term \( \psi_i \), this aspect is irrelevant for the profit impact (conditional on \( \rho_i \)).

While it is very intuitive, this critical role played by pass-through is also far from obvious. Weyl & Fabinger (2013) present, for a general class of symmetric oligopoly models, a simple formula for the impact of a market-wide cost change on aggregate producer surplus (see also Atkin & Donaldson 2015; Miller, Osborne & Sheu 2017). The profit impact depends on a market-wide rate of pass-through as well as on a “conduct parameter” that incorporates the level of firms’ profit margins and the price elasticity of market demand. By contrast, within the GLM, the firm-level profit impact depends solely on pass-through—no additional information about conduct parameter(s) is needed. This

\(^{24}\)We here note an issue to do with aggregation across firms. Suppose that the GLM is applied to all firms in an industry. If pass-through exceeds 100% for all firms, then A4 would imply that output for each firm rises in response to regulation. In equilibrium, if all firms’ demands are downward-sloping, this would lead to a contradiction. So, in an equilibrium context, given A1–A4 for each firm, pass-through can exceed 100%, so that profits rise, for at most \( n - 1 \) firms in the industry.
further simplification of incidence analysis is the primary attraction of the GLM. Compared to the existing literature, the GLM allows for near-arbitrary heterogeneity across firms but makes heavy use of the linear structure implied by A4.

One interpretation is that the GLM is incompletely-specified as a model but that pass-through information is, in effect, sufficient to “close the model”. Consider a market with \( n \) firms selling differentiated products. Standard industrial-organization models specify \( n \) demand equations and, based on profit-maximization, then derive \( n \) supply equations. With the GLM, we specify only \( i \)'s supply curve and show how \( i \)'s profit impact is fully captured by \( i \)'s pass-through rate—which contains all relevant information about the remaining \( 2n - 1 \) model equations. In our setting, pass-through therefore also captures the import of any departures from Nash and/or profit-maximizing behaviour.

It is clear that the formula from Proposition 1 can still approximately hold even if A3 or A4 are violated, that is, if firm \( i \) faces a mildly non-linear demand curve or had a production technology with slightly increasing or decreasing returns to scale. An important observation is that such modest departures from the GLM do not introduce a systematic bias to the results. For example, if A1–A3 hold and \( n \) symmetric firms play Cournot-Nash (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz 2013), then it is easy to check that the formula from Proposition 1(a) will overstate the true profit decline if the demand curve is concave but understate it with convex demand.

Up to this point, we have treated \( i \)'s pass-through rate as a parameter. In general, it can depend on a wide range of factors, including the number of firms in the market, their strategies and the intensity of competition, the degree of product differentiation, and on how strongly \( i \)'s cost rises relative to other firms. To progress further, there are two basic approaches. One is to choose a specific model of competition and derive the theoretical pass-through rate in that context; another is to combine the structural result from Proposition 1 with empirical estimates of pass-through—to which we turn in the next section.

In Appendix A, we present two theoretical extensions of the GLM. The first is a simple model of oligopolistic second-degree price discrimination in which customers who buy earlier pay less; this is an important feature, for example, of the airline market. The second features an “end of pipe” abatement technology (altering A3), in which the firm makes an investment that cleans up its production ex post. We show that, in both of these settings, Proposition 1 on firm-specific cost pass-through as a sufficient statistic is preserved. For the first extension, marginal pass-through is now defined in terms of the average price paid by consumers.
4 Carbon cost pass-through for US airlines

This section illustrates the utility of the theory: Using the GLM, we estimate the profit impacts of (future) carbon pricing on the US aviation market. We begin with brief background on aviation and climate change policy. We then discuss our strategy to move from the GLM-based theory to an empirical application to airlines. We then describe our airline data, present our econometric model, and discuss the empirical findings. We close with a range of empirical robustness checks.

4.1 Background on aviation and climate change policy

Airlines currently produce around 2.5% of global CO\textsubscript{2} emissions (McCollum, Gould & Green 2009); as these emissions occur high up in the atmosphere, an effect known as climatic forcing means that the proportion of “effective” emissions is around twice as high. Moreover, airline emissions are projected to grow well into the 21st century—because of rising global demand for air travel and as there are currently no obvious possibilities for large-scale substitution away from jet engines to low-carbon technologies. As other sectors of the economy, such as electricity generation, decarbonize more quickly the role of aviation in future climate policy is set to grow. Economic regulation therefore appears increasingly likely over the next decade or so as countries seek to implement internationally-agreed climate targets in a cost-effective manner.

Aviation is already subject to carbon pricing in some international jurisdictions. Intra-EU flights have since 2012 been included in the EU’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). However the impact on airlines has been limited by a low carbon price, mostly in the range of €5-10/tCO\textsubscript{2}. Aviation has recently also been included in some regional trading schemes in China, though again with very low carbon prices. As of April 2018, Sweden has introduced an additional carbon tax, on all flights departing from Sweden, that operates alongside the EU ETS. The first global aviation emissions reduction agreement was negotiated by the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and signed by its 191 member nations in October 2016; it amounts to a carbon-offset scheme for emissions growth after 2020.

In this paper, we study the domestic US airline market. This is the world’s largest aviation market, producing around 28% of global aviation emissions. While the US market has so far not been subject to carbon pricing, policy attention seems likely to increase over time. At a baseline carbon price of $50/tCO\textsubscript{2}, its 2014 emissions of 172 million tCO\textsubscript{2} would have had a value of $8.6 billion. We study the domestic market because international aviation is regulated under a separate organization and set of agreements.
4.2 From economic theory to empirical application

The US aviation market since the 2000s has been largely dominated by several legacy carriers (Alaskan, American, Delta, Hawaiian, United and US Airways) and a large low-cost carrier, Southwest Airlines. Legacy airlines were established before deregulation in 1978; they tend to operate hub-and-spoke networks with relatively high costs and high levels of service while low-cost airlines tend to offer direct flights at lower prices (Borenstein 1992). It is well-established in the literature that market power is an important feature of the deregulated airline industry.25

Our unit of analysis is a product, which we take to be a route offered by particular firm (a “carrier-route”). There are important carrier-route heterogeneities that any model should seek to accommodate. First, each carrier-route is its own differentiated product: a flight along a given route on Southwest is not the same product as a flight on American (they may differ in leg room, service, complimentary refreshments, air miles, etc.). Hence each carrier-route has a different demand profile. Second, costs are heterogeneous: the portfolio of aircraft used by a given carrier, and the proportion of seats filled, vary from route to route, with significant impacts on costs. Third, the competitive environment varies: the set of competitor firms on each carrier-route is heterogeneous, both in terms of the number of firms and the technologies they use; moreover, the conduct of rivals can vary: one carrier may behave highly competitively on one route and less competitively on another (even facing the same competitors on each route). Because of these complexities, it is difficult to know with confidence which specific model of competition is best suited to each individual route.

Our objective is to quantify the impacts of environmental regulation, specifically carbon pricing, in this competitive setting. We use detailed data on prices and costs, described below, over the period 2002–2014. Leveraging the GLM, we can estimate profit impacts while remaining agnostic about the precise mode of competition across routes. In the US context, there is currently no carbon pricing so we have \( \tau = 0 \) while we set \( \tau = $50/t\text{CO}_2 \), roughly in line with estimates of the global social cost of carbon (Nordhaus 2017). (As will become clear, our estimated profit impacts generally scale linearly with the carbon price.) In particular, Proposition 1 shows that the rate of carbon cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic for profit impacts at the carrier-route level.

Carbon emissions are not priced in US aviation, so we cannot estimate carbon pass-through rates directly. Instead we estimate fuel cost pass-through rates, and use these to

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25 A third type of carrier in the US market, the regional airline, is not included in our analysis.
26 Berry & Jia (2010) estimate some of these heterogeneities when calibrating their structural model of the US aviation market. Berry (1992) emphasises the importance of heterogeneity in demand, as well as cost.
27 Kwan & Rutherford (2015), among many others, document heterogeneity of fuel efficiency; Berry & Jia (2010)’s structural estimation predicts similar heterogeneities.
28 Brander & Zhang (1990) estimate conduct parameters for 33 duopoly routes served by American and United, and report considerable heterogeneity.
predict carbon cost pass-through. From the viewpoint of a cost-minimizing airline, these costs are equivalent: paying an extra $1 per unit fuel due to a carbon price is the same as paying an extra $1 on the price of the fuel. The conversion is simple, since 1 gallon of jet fuel produces 0.00957 tons of CO$_2$ when burned. Importantly, unlike existing carbon prices in the EU or any other jurisdictions, fuel prices have varied substantially over the period we study: the maximum is 540% larger than the minimum. This variation exceeds in magnitude the impact of a $50/tCO$_2$ carbon price, given the carbon intensity of jet fuel. Hence our simulated carbon price shock lies within the range of fuel cost shocks that airlines responded to over the sample period, conferring some external validity on our estimates.\textsuperscript{29}

Our empirical approach is based on A1–A4 underlying the GLM being appropriate for airline competition. We therefore now discuss these four assumptions in turn:

\textit{Input price-taking} (A1) is an appropriate assumption in that an airline cannot influence the global oil price, which is the primary determinant of its jet fuel price. Likewise, the price-taking assumption is clearly appropriate in the context of an emissions tax and also approximately correct in the context of a cap-and-trade scheme in which firm $i$ is one among many as in the EU ETS and other current systems.

\textit{Cost-minimizing inputs} (A2) also appears reasonable for airlines. Fuel costs are often an airline’s largest cost, amounting to 20–50% of its total cost base (Zhang & Zhang 2017) so it clearly has strong incentives to minimize fuel costs. Future carbon costs are likely to be managed in conjunction with an airline’s overall commodity-market exposure, so we expect these to be similarly optimized. Examples of fuel/emissions reductions by airlines include adjusting flight time, cabin weight, and leasing newer aircraft. These kinds of reversible, continuous and often operational changes are consistent with our framework; anything that airlines did in the past in response to fuel prices, they are likely to do again in response to a carbon price.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Constant returns to scale} (A3) is a more substantive assumption, though it is standard in much of the airlines literature.\textsuperscript{31} The evidence on whether it holds empirically is inconclusive: while some studies estimate modest scale economies others find no such evidence (Zhang & Zhang 2017) so our analysis is consistent with the notion that these

\textsuperscript{29}A similar approach of using variation in other input costs to estimate the impact of future environmental costs is also taken by Miller, Osborne & Sheu (2017). In related work, Ganapati, Shapiro & Walker (2016) estimate the pass-through of energy input prices across six US manufacturing industries while Bushnell & Humber (2017) focus on the pass-through of natural gas prices in the fertilizer industry and its implications for the allocation of carbon emissions permits.

\textsuperscript{30}Other abatement activities that fit less well with our approach are one-off, predominantly capital changes, such as purchasing new aircraft or installing wing tips. If these kinds of abatement dominate over the period we study, our historic average pass-through results will give less good predictions of the impact of future carbon pricing.

\textsuperscript{31}Brander & Zhang (1990) discuss how to conceptualise constant marginal costs in the case of airlines; Berry & Jia (2010) estimate marginal costs which are constant for a given vector of route characteristics.
are relatively weak in comparison with the marginal price-cost shifts studied here.\footnote{There is stronger evidence for economies of scope: a higher network density of its route portfolio confers a competitive advantage on an airline—but this is not inconsistent with the GLM theory. As is common in the airlines literature, our empirical analysis considers each route separately, without accounting explicitly for potentially complex network effects with other routes (see, e.g., Ciliberto & Tamer 2009). A strength of our estimation procedure, however, is that it allows for arbitrarily complex networks, so long as these are stable over the period we study.} Note also that the presence of fixed costs is not an issue for the application of the GLM.

Linear product market behaviour (A4) is the core assumption underlying the GLM. We do not have a direct empirical test of the validity of the GLM in a particular market, so we work on the basis that A4 is at least approximately correct. Importantly, we allow the proportionality factor \( \psi \) to vary arbitrarily both over routes and across carriers. This means that, in contrast to standard oligopoly models, a route/carrier with a higher market share does not necessarily have a higher profit margin. In this sense, the GLM is quite flexible—and hence also more difficult to reject.

4.3 Description of the data

Our dataset is a panel of price and cost data for airlines over the period 2002Q1–2014Q4.\footnote{We choose 2002 as the start year because the events of 11 September 2001 had a considerable impact on the airline industry, which we wished to avoid. Our end date is chosen to avoid the 2015 “mega merger” between American Airlines and US Airways.} For each carrier \( i \), route \( j \) and quarter \( t \), we have the average ticket price \( p_{ijt} \), the average per-person fuel cost \( k_{ijt} \), and a vector of covariates. Hence we have a balanced panel, consisting of \( N = 615 \) carrier-route observations for \( T = 52 \) quarters—with a total number of observations in excess of 30,000. All monetary quantities are in real 2014Q4 USD.

We construct our data by combining elements of three datasets from the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Price data come from the DB1A Origin and Destination Survey, a 10\% sample of all airline tickets sold.\footnote{We use a cleaned version of the DB1A provided by Severin Borenstein. The following ticket types are excluded: international, first class, frequent flier (those with a price less than $20), entry errors (price higher than $9,998 or five times the industry standard for that route-time), and open or circular itineraries. Observations are aggregated up to the carrier-route-time level.} Prices are for a one-way trip; all round-trip tickets are split equally into two one-way observations. A route is defined by its origin and destination airports, regardless of direction. Our sample is formed by taking all carrier-routes that meet two criteria. First, we examine only direct flights, as is standard in much of the airlines literature.\footnote{Indirect flights— involving a change of aircraft at another airport en route, using the airline’s hub-and-spoke network—are well-known to have different economic characteristics to direct flights. Excluding indirect flights is, therefore, commonplace in the airlines literature (e.g., Borenstein & Rose 1994; Goolsbee & Syverson 2008; Gerardi & Shapiro 2009).} Second, we take only carrier-routes that were continuously operated for the time period we study.\footnote{We consider a route to be operated by a carrier in any quarter where it carried at least 1,000 passengers. This is equivalent to one small (83 passenger) service per week. (Because of the lag structure in our specification, this requires the route to be continuously operated over the slightly longer period 2000Q1-2014Q4.)} This results in a sample
containing 36% of the relevant carriers’ revenue. We then calculate $p_{ijt}$, an average of all fairs purchased on carrier-route $ij$ in quarter $t$.

The remaining datasets (T-100 and Form 41) are used to construct $k_{ijt}$, the average per-passenger fuel cost for flying with carrier $i$ on route $j$ in time $t$.\(^{37}\) We construct this by averaging carrier-route $ij$’s aircraft-specific fuel expenditure, weighted by the proportion of flights operated by that aircraft type on carrier-route $ij$, and then divide by the proportion of filled seats. (Appendix B describes this procedure in more detail.) The value of $k_{ijt}$ is the outcome of cost minimization by the airline, and is determined by three factors: First, the market price of jet fuel, which tracks the crude oil price. Second, the fuel efficiency of the passenger’s journey. This is principally determined by the type and age of aircraft used, the configuration the seating and the proportion of seats filled—but any other variation in the airline’s physical operating procedures can also influence this factor. Third, the carrier’s use of hedging or other financial products when buying fuel. This varies significantly both between carriers and over time for a given carrier. For example, in our sample period, Southwest was known for its extensive use of hedging, while US Airways never hedged. Given the volatility of oil prices, carriers ended up paying very different prices in the same period. For example, in 2008 (when prices were rising) US Airways paid 30% more for each gallon of fuel than Southwest, whereas in 2009 (when prices fell) it paid 18% less.\(^{38}\)

Having constructed $p_{ijt}$, $k_{ijt}$ and a set of covariates (described below), we keep data for the six largest legacy carriers and for Southwest.\(^{39}\) The routes in our sample make up 25% by revenue of all domestic US aviation activity over the period.\(^{40}\)

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of airlines’ prices, costs and other variables related to competition and environmental performance. Given that their characteristics are quite similar, but distinct from Southwest, we combine the six legacy carriers into a single group; see Table 9 in Appendix C for the detailed breakdown by legacy carrier. We see that Southwest tends to fly shorter routes than the legacy carriers; it charges lower prices and has lower fuel costs and emissions. Southwest is comparable to the average legacy carrier in terms of size, capacity utilization, and the number of competitors it faces on its routes.

Figure 1 shows some industry-wide trends over the period. Panel (a) compares the

\(^{37}\)The overlap between the DB1A and T-100 is good but not perfect (see Goolsbee & Syverson (2008) for a fuller discussion). Merging with data from T-100 results in around 10% of DB1A revenue being dropped.

\(^{38}\)Turner & Lim (2015) document and analyse the different hedging strategies of US airlines, and the different effective fuel prices that result.

\(^{39}\)This is the result of dropping three very small carriers: one regional (ExpressJet), and two low cost carriers (Frontier and Spirit). These airlines have an average of only 12 routes each.

\(^{40}\)The 7 large carriers have a market share by revenue of 61% over the period (this rises to 69% at the end of the period due to mergers). The proportion of each carrier’s revenue included in our sample is shown in Table 1, with the heterogeneity coming principally from differences in the use of direct vs hub-and-spoke business models.
Table 1: Average (unweighted) prices, per-passenger costs and other characteristics for the carrier-routes in our sample, over 2002Q1–2014Q4. Passengers and revenue are averages over a year.

average per-passenger fuel cost $k_t$ with the spot price of jet fuel. They track each other very closely; the slight lag of fuel costs behind the spot price is principally due to hedging. The figure also reveals substantial variation in fuel costs over the period. Panel (b) plots average ticket prices (left axis) against per-passenger fuel (right axis). As expected, there is generally a positive correlation between price and fuel cost.

### 4.4 Baseline econometric specification

Our baseline regression specification is given by the following equation:

$$p_{ijt} = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \rho_{ij}^m k_{ij,t-m} + X_{ijt}' \beta_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt},$$  

where we are interested in the equilibrium rate of fuel cost pass-through for carrier-route $ij$, $\rho_{ij} = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \rho_{ij}^m$. We include the current per-passenger fuel cost $k_{ijt}$ with 3 quarters of lags, thus allowing for fuel cost adjustment to take up to one year. Hence pass-through $\rho_{ij}$ measures the price increase one year after a permanent $1 increase in fuel costs.\footnote{Our choice of specification reflects the fact that prices can be quickly and fully adjusted by airlines. Hence we do not include a lagged dependent variable, reflecting a “speed of adjustment”, such as in many dynamic econometric specifications. Our approach is common in the pass-through estimation literature.}
Our specification does not directly include competitors’ costs. Clearly, however, a firm’s equilibrium price is often a function of its own as well as its rivals’ costs. The literature on pass-through estimation takes a variety of approaches to this issue. Miller, Osboure & Sheu (2017) include in their overall pass-through rate the coefficient on a measure of firm-specific competitive pressure to capture the rival-cost component of pass through. Stolper (2018) argues for the theoretical importance of including rivals’ costs but then focuses on an overall industry cost pass-through for reasons of identification. Our approach is to allow firm $i$ on route $j$ to have costs $k_{ijt}$ that may be correlated in any arbitrary way with any other rival $l$’s costs: $k_{ijt} = \alpha_{il} k_{ljt} \forall l$. The substantive assumption is that, however own and rivals’ costs are related, this is unchanging over the period we study. On this basis, for carrier-route $ij$, the overall pass-through rate $\rho_{ij}$ we obtain contains both own-cost and rival-cost effects.\footnote{Fabra & Reguant (2014) analyze pass-through for a homogeneous good (electricity) with a single market price. By estimating a single regression, their pass-through rate gives the dollar increase in the electricity price when the carbon costs of the marginal supplier increase by $1$.}

Carrier-specific pass-through rates $\rho_i$ are obtained from specification (7) using what Pesaran & Smith (1995) call a “Mean Group” estimator. This involves running a separate regression for each carrier-route, and then taking a weighted average to obtain a pass-through rate at the carrier level. (The weights are explained below.) This imposes no homogeneity restrictions on the parameters across carrier-routes, which is important given the heterogeneities discussed above. A fixed effects specification (which we report for completeness in Section 4.8), by contrast, would impose homogeneity on all parameters other than the constant.\footnote{Estimating equation (7) as a system of $N$ seemingly unrelated regression equations would not change the point estimates but would give efficiency gains. SURE estimation is, however, not feasible here because the number of equations in our system is so much larger than the degrees of freedom of each.
to vary across carrier-routes does not mean the routes are independent in an economic sense, rather that their interdependencies are one of the many characteristics captured by the pass-through rate that we seek to estimate.

Equation (7) cannot be estimated using OLS because the per-passenger fuel cost $k_{ijt}$ is potentially endogenous. It depends on the number of passengers flying in quarter $t$, which in turn will generally be an outcome of the price $p_{ijt}$. So our dependent variable includes in its denominator an outcome variable, introducing the possibility of simultaneity bias. To address this, we use the spot price of jet fuel as an instrument for fuel cost $k_{ijt}$. Since the price of jet fuel is determined by the global oil price, it is exogenous to passenger numbers on a particular route, satisfying the exclusion principle. In order to accommodate potential hedging, we use 8 quarters of spot prices to estimate the 4 quarters of fuel costs in equation (7). Hence, the first stage regressions are given by:

$$k_{ij,t-m} = \sum_{q=0}^{7} \gamma_{ij}^{m,q} f_{t-q} + X'_{ijt} \beta_{ij}^m + \epsilon_{ijt}^m \text{ for each } m \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\} \quad (8)$$

where $f_t$ is the spot fuel price.\footnote{\textsuperscript{44}We use jet fuel price data from Bloomberg: JETINYPR index (New York Harbor 54-Grade Jet Fuel).}

Equation (7) also includes a vector of controls $X_{ijt}$ which capture changes in supply and demand that could otherwise introduce omitted variable bias into the regression. In addition to a constant, $X_{ijt}$ is made up of the following variables: (i) GDP growth, $g_{jt}$, to proxy for demand. We include this because jet fuel prices closely track the oil price, which may be systematically related to demand for air travel. In order to obtain as granular as possible a measure of demand for travel on route $j$, we use the average of the state GDPs in which each airport at either end of the route resides. (ii) We construct an index of certain key (non-fuel) costs at the carrier level, $c_{it}$, principally made up of labour and aircraft maintenance costs. (iii) The number of competitor firms, $n_{jt}$. If this quantity remained stable over time, then there would be no need to include it in regression (7); however we do see entry and exit in the data, which could potentially be systematically related to fuel costs. (iv) The number of potential entrants, $n^p_{jt}$. This is defined as the number of airlines operating services out of both the origin and destination of route $j$, but not actually connecting these with a direct flight. Goolsbee & Syverson (2008) show that potential entrants have an significant effect on incumbents’ pricing. (v) Quarterly dummies, to control for any seasonality in pricing. Finally, given the time-series nature of equation (7), we report Newey-West standard errors throughout, which are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent.
4.5 Illustration for an individual carrier-route

Before presenting the full results, we illustrate our approach to estimating pass-through rates for a single route, Southwest’s service between Phoenix, Arizona (Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, PHX) and San Antonio, Texas (San Antonio International Airport, SAT). Table 2 gives average prices and costs for this route; the comparison with Table 1 shows that it is reasonably representative of Southwest’s portfolio of routes in our dataset. The average ticket price is $200, and the average fuel cost is $33 per passenger. Figure 2(a) shows how the ticket price $p_{ijt}$ changed with the fuel cost $k_{ijt}$ over time. The causal component of this relationship is what we seek to estimate. Figure 2(b) shows the movement of the covariates in $X_{ijt}$ over the period.

![Figure 2: Time trends for Southwest’s service from Phoenix (PHX) to San Antonio (SAT), for 2002Q1-2014Q4. Panel (a) shows ticket prices and per-passenger fuel costs. Panel (b) shows the covariates.](image)

Estimating equation (7) for $i =$ Southwest and $j =$ PHX-SAT using 2SLS gives an equilibrium rate of pass-through of $\rho = 1.38$ ($\pm 0.62$). (Throughout the text, 95% confidence intervals are given in parentheses.) Table 7 in Appendix C.1 contains the full regression results. The instruments are comfortably far from being weak. The covariates generally have their expected signs, although some are not significantly different from zero; the relatively large standard errors are not surprising for a regression with 52 observations and 19 parameters to estimate. Looking ahead to the full results, the standard errors will fall dramatically as we move to the Mean Group estimate and bring in many more observations.

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45 The route a little longer than average for Southwest; it is correspondingly a little more expensive in terms of terms of ticket price and costs. No other carriers in our sample operate this route continuously over the period 2002-2014.

46 The first stage F-statistics for the four lags of the endogenous regressor $k$ are 57, 40, 86, 213, respectively (see Appendix C.1 for additional statistics). That our instrument (the spot fuel price) is very relevant in first stage regression Equation (8) is not surprising given the obvious relationship between fuel prices and airline fuel costs, as documented for the sample as a whole in Figure 2b.
PHX-SAT
Southwest

<table>
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<th>Results</th>
<th>PHX-SAT Southwest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass through</td>
<td>1.38 (0.32)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Profit impact (% of revenue)</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Descriptive statistics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Price ($)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuel cost ($)</td>
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<td>Emissions (tCO₂)</td>
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<td>Revenue in 2014 ($ million)</td>
<td>17.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Southwest’s PHX-SAT service for the period 2002Q1–2014Q4. The profit impact and carbon costs are for a carbon price of $50/tCO₂. The descriptive statistics are averages over the period.

Up to this point, we have made no particular assumptions about Southwest’s behaviour on this route, other than the standard assumptions inherent in running a linear regression. Now invoking the GLM’s A1–A4 and using Proposition 1(a), we conclude that Southwest’s pass-through in excess of 100% implies its sales and profits rise with the carbon price; in equilibrium, this implies that it gains market share from rivals on this route. Table 2 summarizes the predicted impact of a $50/tCO₂ carbon price implemented at the end of the period (2014Q4). At that time, emissions on this route were 0.13 tCO₂ per passenger per flight so this translates into a carbon cost shock of $6.40 per passenger. Given the pass-through rate $ρ = 1.38$, Proposition 1 shows that Southwest’s profits rise by $0.38 (± 0.62)$ million per year, or $+2.22% (± 3.59)$ of revenue on this route.

4.6 Estimation results for all routes

We now present Mean Group estimates of pass-through rates for all routes at the carrier level. We obtain these obtained by estimating pass-through rates $ρ_{ij}$ from specification (7) for each carrier-route. Using Proposition 1(a), the profit impact of a carbon price $τ$ on carrier $i$ across all its $j$ routes is given by $ΔΠ_i ≃ τ \sum_j 2ε_{ij}(0)(1 − ρ_{ij}) = 2(1 − ρ_i)τε_i(0)$, where $ρ_i$ is its emissions-weighted average pass-through rate. We use its 2014 emissions
to compute the weights.

Table 3 summarizes the full set of results; Table 8 in Appendix C.2 gives the detailed regression results.\(^{47}\) We find strong evidence of pass-through heterogeneity: Southwest has a weighted average carbon cost pass-through of \(\rho = 1.48 \ (\pm \ 0.08)\), compared to the legacy carrier average of \(\rho = 0.55 \ (\pm \ 0.12)\).\(^{48}\) Figure 3 plots the distributions of pass-through estimates for each group.\(^{49}\) Assuming the that GLM’s A1-A4 hold for each carrier-route, we estimate that a $50/tCO\textsubscript{2}$ carbon price raises Southwest’s profits by +2.95% (± 0.44). In stark contrast, the legacy carriers would suffer an average profit impact of –3.56% (± 1.02) of revenue. In short, Southwest passes on more than its carbon cost shock while legacy carriers experience reduction in their profit margins and market share.\(^{50}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass through</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit impact</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>-3.56</td>
<td>-1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% revenue)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit neutral</td>
<td>-0.96</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permit allocation</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. routes</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. obs.</td>
<td>11,024</td>
<td>20,956</td>
<td>31,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Estimated pass-through rates and predicted profit impacts of a $50/tCO\textsubscript{2}$ carbon price. The descriptive statistics are averages over the period, except for the carbon cost shock which is calculated for 2014 emissions intensity.

Making the admittedly expedient assumption that the pass-through rates obtained from our sample of continuously operated routes are representative of all routes operated by these airlines, we cautiously calculate a total profit impact of +$0.51 \ (± \ 0.07) billion

\(^{47}\)We again group the six legacy carriers together; Table 10 in Appendix C.3 gives the results for individual legacy airline, confirming their similarity also in terms of pass-through.

\(^{48}\)The carrier-level standard errors are calculated on the assumption that each pass-through rate is estimated with error, but that these errors are independent of each other. Hence the variance of the weighted average \(\rho_i = \sum_{ij} \alpha_{ij} \rho_{ij}\), reduces to \(\text{Var}[\rho_i] = \sum_j \alpha_{ij}^2 \text{Var}[\rho_{ij}]\), where \(\alpha_{ij} = \frac{e_{ij}}{\sum_j e_{ij}}\).

\(^{49}\)The distribution of pass-throughs does not necessarily have a clear economic interpretation. For example, it is unlikely an outlier in the legacy distribution is a carrier-route that really has \(\rho = -5\). Pesaran, Shin & Smith (1999) conclude their discussion of this issue as follows: “Most studies that estimate separate relationships for a number of groups find differences in coefficients that are not only statistically significant, but also economically implausible. [...] Despite this, the MG [Mean Group] ... estimates of the long-run coefficients tend to be sensible.”

\(^{50}\)It is worth noting that, despite its higher pass-through rate, Southwest’s price remains below that of the legacy carriers. The average emission cost shocks are $6.48 and $7.57 for Southwest and the Legacy carriers respectively, given their 2014 emissions. This translates in to price rises of $9.74 and $6.41, respectively, to give final prices of $187.03 and $249.68. Note that this simple comparison of means is indicative only, as the portfolio of routes is different for each airline (see below for further discussion).
Figure 3: Kernel density plots showing the distribution of the pass-throughs for Southwest and the Legacy carriers.

for Southwest and −$1.46 (± 0.41) billion for the legacy carriers. This compares with the companies’ reported 5-year-average annual profits of, respectively, $1.17 billion and $4.26 billion in 2014. Hence our results suggest a $50/1CO₂ carbon price would increase Southwest’s profits by +44% while cutting those of the legacy carriers by 34%.

To the best of our knowledge, this finding of pass-through heterogeneity in the airline industry is novel. It is, however, consistent with earlier findings in the literature. Goolsbee & Syverson (2008), Ciliberto & Tamer (2009), and Berry & Jia (2010) variously point to Southwest being more efficient, better able to cope with shocks, or especially threatening to its rivals. Gaudenzi & Bucciol (2016) report jet fuel price rises are associated with significantly more negative stock-market returns for legacy carriers than for Southwest.

The final result summarized in Table 3 is the profit-neutral permit allocation (Hepburn, Quah & Ritz 2013). This is the proportion of a firm’s pre-regulation level of emissions,

---

51 It is unlikely that the continuously operated routes have the identical pass-through to routes closed or newly opened over the period 2002-2014. The average would be similar if under- and over-estimates coming from closed and opened routes (or vice versa) approximately cancelled each other out. Similarly there is no reason to believe the direct and indirect routes would have identical pass-through. Hence, the extrapolated results should treated with caution. To give a sense of the difference between direct, continuously-operated (our sample) and indirect or non-continuously-operated (not in our sample) routes, respectively, average quarterly descriptive statistics are: revenue $7.75 million vs $0.19 million; passengers 42,000 vs 860; (non-stop) distance 960 miles vs 1250 miles; number of observations 29,500 vs 1,740,000. Dropping observations with fewer than 1000 passengers per quarter, the above statistics for the non-continuously-operated routes become: revenue $0.91 million; passengers 4,300; (non-stop) distance 1400 miles; number of observations 283,000.

52 Using profits as reported in Form 41, Schedule P-1.2. The above figures are 5-year averages; the actual yearly profits reported in 2014 were $0.63 billion and $2.24 billion, respectively, for Southwest and the legacy carriers. Revenue in 2014 was $17.3 billion and $41.2 billion, respectively.

53 Gaudenzi & Bucciol (2016) stress differences in hedging strategies; our empirical findings here, in effect, offer a new explanation for their results.
that would need to be freely allocated to preserve its pre-regulation profits. We find that, due to their low pass-through, legacy carriers would need 90% (±26%)—that is, almost all—of their permits for free. By contrast, Southwest’s profit-neutral allocation is strongly negative—which is the flipside of its profits rising with carbon regulation. Our industry-wide profit-neutral allocation of 43% is considerably higher than previous empirical findings for sectors such as electricity and cement, suggesting that aviation gets hit relatively hard by carbon pricing.

4.7 What explains the heterogeneity in pass-through rates?

We next present a decomposition of the difference in pass-through rates based on three factors: route portfolio, production costs, and product differentiation.

Table 1 revealed that Southwest tends to operate routes that are shorter than the legacy carriers. Indeed, long haul flights are likely to have systematically different characteristics: on the demand side, there are fewer close substitutes (such as bus or rail travel); on the supply side, entry may be more difficult so there may be greater market power.

To quantify how route characteristics drive the overall difference in airlines’ pass-through rates, we recalculate carrier-level averages for the subset of routes that serve a market which is common to both airline types. We compute an average pass-through that is not weighted by emissions, so the importance of a route in an airline’s overall portfolio is not distorted by this measure. The results for the 49 common routes are reported in Table 4; the unweighted average pass-throughs are somewhat higher than our previous weighted average results. Moving to common routes narrows the difference in pass-through rates considerably, mainly because legacy pass-through is much higher. Based on the proportional change, we attribute 62% of the original difference in pass-through rates in Table 3 to differences in the airlines’ route portfolios.

To further explore these differences, we present in Table 5 a cross-tabulation of weighted average pass-through rates. Taking the full sample of carrier-routes, we calculate the quartiles (i.e., 25th and 75th percentiles) of route distance and number of firms (n) operating the route. This cross-tabulation shows that Southwest has significantly higher pass-through rates on its shorter routes, however competitive they are (as proxied by n). Indeed, the number of firms has no clear relationship with pass-through rate for either carrier type.

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54 Where two legacy carriers serve such a market, we take the average.
55 The ratio of Southwest to legacy average pass-through on the common routes is 1.64. Using Southwest’s pass-through of 1.48 as a baseline, we would predict a legacy carrier pass-through for all routes of 1.48/1.64=0.90 (rather than the 0.55 we observe).
56 The relationship between distance and both demand and supply has been studied for a long time in the literature (Brander & Zhang 1990; Berry & Jia (2010).
57 A similar conclusion comes out of running a regression of estimated pass-through rates on distance and the number of firms: the coefficient on distance is significantly negative, whereas the coefficient on n is not statistically different from 0. Using the Herfindahl index instead of the number of firms as a measure of competition yields similar results from both the cross-tabulation and regression.
This suggests that it is differences in demand patterns associated with flight distance between Southwest and legacy carriers—more than differences in supply conditions—that are driving pass-through asymmetries.58

There still remains a substantial pass-through difference between Southwest and the legacy carriers even on identical routes. We now further decompose this into asymmetries in cost efficiency, and then turn to asymmetries related to demand. We find that Southwest has lower average fuel costs on like-for-like routes: $30.14 per passenger compared to $36.02 for the legacy carriers. This is principally due to use of newer aircraft and more efficient seating configurations. The absence of any demand asymmetries between firms implies a single market price; in such cases, any two firms’ \((i \text{ and } j)\) pass-through rates are related only by their relative cost shocks, \(\rho_j / \rho_i = z_i(\tau) / z_j(\tau)\). Southwest’s superior fuel efficiency thus explains 68% of the remaining difference in pass-through rates on common routes (and hence a further 26% of the original difference in Table 3).59

Finally, then, 32% of the pass-through differential on common routes remains to be explained (corresponding to 12% of the original difference). This residual difference now shows heterogeneity in pass-through rates for a uniform cost shock on common routes (that hits all carriers equally). We therefore attribute this residual to demand-side asymmetries between carriers, based on their differentiated-product offering. Such demand asymmetries now imply departures from a single market price on common routes so also mean that differences in competitive conduct may be driving pass-through asymmetry.60

In sum, this decomposition suggests that 62% of the pass-through difference is due

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58 A limitation of our GLM-based approach is that we are not able to identify the underlying causal factors driving the results to the extent that a full structural model may be able to.

59 All else equal, we would expect the legacy carriers to have a pass-through rate 16% lower than Southwest using \(\rho_j / \rho_i = z_i(\tau) / z_j(\tau)\). Using Southwest as the baseline, this explains 26% of the original difference in Table 3.

60 For example, Southwest has a higher market share on the common routes in our sample; this is one factor than can lead to asymmetry in pass-through in the context of differentiated-products competition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th></th>
<th>Legacy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>distance $\in [0, 570)$</td>
<td>distance $\in [570, 1034)$</td>
<td>distance $\in [1034, 3784)$</td>
<td>distance $\in [0, 570)$</td>
<td>distance $\in [570, 1034)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small $n \in [1, 2.3)$</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium $n \in [2.3, 4.3)$</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large $n \in [4.3, 12.5)$</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All $n$</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(2.35)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: A cross tabulation of weighted average pass-through rates. The columns are triciles of route distance, and the rows are triciles of average number of firms $n$ operating the route.

...to different route portfolios; around two thirds of the remaining difference is driven by Southwest’s superior fuel efficiency and the final third stems from differences in demand patterns (and competitive conduct).

4.8 Further results and robustness analysis

We have run a number of robustness tests and alternative specifications to explore the stability of our results and some further determinants of the pass-through rate. We summarize the findings here; Appendix D gives further details. We explore other determinants of pass-through by adding to the baseline specification (7) an interaction term between fuel cost $k_{ijt}$ and another variable of interest; this gives rise to specification (11) described in Appendix D.

**Entry and exit.** We interact fuel costs $k_{ijt}$ with the number of firms operating route $j$ in quarter $t$. We find no effect: the Mean Group equilibrium coefficient on the interaction terms is not statistically different from zero for either Southwest or the legacy carriers. A further check on our baseline results is a comparison of the weighted average pass-through rates for the subset of routes seeing little or zero entry and exit. These pass-through rates are similar to the full sample, also suggesting that entry and exit does not have a
substantial impact on in our data. (See Appendix D.3.)

**Competition from Southwest.** Prior literature has highlighted the key role that Southwest plays for US airline competition. We explore this in terms of pass-through by first interacting fuel cost $k_{ijt}$ with a dummy equal to 1 if Southwest is competing with route $j$ in quarter $t$. We find a significantly negative effect ($-0.24 \pm 0.16$), consistent with the intuition that Southwest constrains the legacy carriers’ ability to raise prices. However, when we include a second interaction term, of fuel cost with potential entry on route $j$ by Southwest, we find the coefficient on Southwest actual presence falls to 0, while the coefficient on its potential entry is significant and very negative ($-0.91 \pm 0.71$). This suggests that it is the threat of entry that constrains legacy carriers’ ability to pass-through fuel cost rises; this is a new empirical finding in line with Goolsbee & Syverson (2008). (See Appendix D.4.)

**Asymmetric cost pass-through.** We test for the presence of asymmetric pass-through (Peltzman 2000) by interacting fuel costs with a dummy variable equal to 1 when prices are rising and 0 otherwise, and using first differences of the data. We find little evidence of a “rockets and feathers” effect: only 9.9% of carrier-routes have a significant (at 5%) coefficient on the interaction term. (See Appendix D.5.)

**Input price volatility.** Emissions trading schemes and carbon taxes differ primarily in their carbon-price volatility. If input volatility affects pass-through, then it will also alter profit impacts in our framework. We therefore interact fuel costs with a measure of fuel price volatility, and find a significant negative coefficient of roughly equal magnitude for Southwest and the legacy carriers. This in turn suggests that, all else equal, the profit impacts of a given average carbon price on industry will be worse under an emissions trading scheme than under a carbon tax. We believe this is a novel reason for why firms might prefer a carbon tax over a trading scheme. (See Appendix D.6.)

**Bankruptcy of legacy carriers.** Several legacy carriers have gone into bankruptcy during our sample period (Borenstein 2011). To test for implications on pass-through, we interact fuel costs $k_{ijt}$ with a dummy equal to 1 when carrier $i$ is bankrupt. We find pass-through rises significantly (by $0.15 \pm 0.06$) when a legacy airline is bankrupt. This is consistent with an intuition that airlines in financial distress can less afford pricing to sustain (future) customer loyalty. (See Appendix D.7.)

**Fixed effects estimation.** As explained above, we believe that Mean Group estimation is the correct approach to estimating equation (7). However, for completeness we also report Fixed Effects regression results, and find similar pass-through rates: 1.31 ($\pm 0.10$) for Southwest and 0.57 ($\pm 0.12$) for the legacy carriers. This suggests that our empirical findings are robust to this alternative specification. (See Appendix D.8.)
Further robustness checks. We estimate specification (7) by OLS, and find similar, though slightly lower pass-through rates. This suggests some common downward bias in the OLS estimate, but also confirms the qualitative finding of higher pass-through for Southwest is robust to the simplest possible estimation procedure. We also re-estimate our baseline results using only the final 10 years of our sample period (2005-2014), and find statistically indistinguishable pass-through rates. This suggests our results are not overly sensitive to the time window chosen. Finally, we estimate a version of equation (7) with prices and costs in logs. This yields an average pass-through elasticity, estimated at 0.21 (± 0.02) for Southwest and 0.15 (± 0.02) for the legacy carriers. (See Appendices D.1, D.2 and D.9.)

5 The “political equilibrium” carbon price

We next present an application of our theory to the political economy of regulation. The GLM allows us to bring together two different strands of literature: (1) an influential literature following Grossman and Helpman (1994) in which firms lobby the government over the magnitude of regulation and its policy is “for sale”; (2) the classic literature following Buchanan (1969) on second-best emissions taxation under imperfect competition. We show that both models are driven, in the same way, by an industry-weighted rate of cost pass-through. Using our empirical results from the previous section, we then derive the “political equilibrium” carbon price for US airlines.

5.1 A model of second-best regulation with political lobbying

As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), consider a partial-equilibrium setting in which the government cares about social welfare $W$ as well as (aggregate) political contributions by $n \geq 2$ regulated firms. Let $K_i(\tau)$ denote firm $i$'s political contribution to the government as a function of the (common) emissions price $\tau$. The government's payoff is:

$$U_{gov}(\tau) = W(\tau) + \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} K_i(\tau),$$

where the parameter $\lambda \geq 0$ measures the government’s openness to lobbying. For $\lambda = 0$, the government’s problem will boil down to standard welfare-maximization; for larger $\lambda$, its regulatory policy is increasingly for sale.

Following Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Grossman and Helpman (1994), the equilibrium of the lobbying game is for each firm $i$ to offer a contribution function $K_i(\tau) = \Pi_i(\tau) + u_i$, where $u_i$ is a constant. Substituting this into the government’s payoff function,

61 By assumption, the government does not have access to another policy instrument (such as a price control) to directly address market power.
the first-order condition for the “political equilibrium” emissions price $\tau^\star(\lambda)$ is given by:

$$\frac{dU_{\text{gov}}(\tau)}{d\tau} = \frac{dW(\tau)}{d\tau} + \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{d\Pi_i(\tau)}{d\tau} = 0. \tag{9}$$

We assume that this problem is well-behaved, and focus on the interesting case of an interior solution with $\tau^\star(\lambda) > 0$. As will become clear, this includes the usual property that an emissions tax is successful at reducing aggregate emissions, $dE(\tau)/d\tau < 0$.

To make further progress, additional assumptions are needed. First, we assume that A1–A4 from the GLM now hold for all firms in the industry. Second, for simplicity, we take each firm’s emissions intensity to be fixed (so that $z_i(\tau) = z_i(0)$), while still allowing for arbitrary heterogeneity across firms. Third, we assume that consumers are utility-maximizers, with aggregate consumer surplus $S = V(x_1, ..., x_i, ..., x_n) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i x_i$, where $V(\cdot)$ is gross consumer utility; unlike much of the literature on second-best emissions pricing (Requate 2006), this allows for firms’ products to be differentiated (both horizontally and/or vertically). Fourth, environmental damages depend on aggregate emissions $D(E)$, where $E = \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i$, and, as usual, are increasing and convex, $D'(\cdot), D''(\cdot) > 0$.

The timing of the game is as follows. First, firms choose their contribution functions $K_i$. Second, government sets the emissions price $\tau$. Third, firms compete according to the GLM (now taking $\tau$ as given, as per A1).

Social welfare can therefore be written, in terms of the emissions tax, as:

$$W(\tau) = V(x_1(\tau), ..., x_i(\tau), ..., x_n(\tau)) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} C_i(x_i(\tau)) - D(E(\tau)),$$

reflecting that firms’ revenues $\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i x_i$ are a transfer from consumers and firms’ emissions costs $\tau E$ are a transfer to government.

As a benchmark, recall that the standard Pigouvian tax to address the environmental externality under perfect competition (that is, marginal utility equals price by consumer optimization, and price then equals marginal cost) is to set the emissions price equal to the social marginal damage (social cost of carbon), $\tau = D'(E(\tau))$.

We thus obtain the following characterization of the equilibrium degree of regulation in terms of pass-through:

**Proposition 2** At an interior solution, the political equilibrium emissions tax satisfies:

$$\tau^\star(\lambda) = \left[ \frac{D'(E(\tau))}{1 - \frac{(1 + 2\lambda)}{\eta(\tau)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_i(\tau)}{E(\tau)} [1 - \rho_i(\tau)]} \right]_{\tau = \tau^\star(\lambda)},$$

where $\eta \equiv [dE(\tau)/E(\tau)] / [d\tau / \tau] < 0$ is the tax elasticity of industry emissions. The political equilibrium tax is less than the Pigouvian tax if and if only industry-weighted
pass-through is less than 100%,

$$\text{sign} \left\{ D' - \tau^*(\lambda) \right\} = \text{sign} \left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_i(\tau)}{E(\tau)} [1 - \rho_i(\tau)] \right\},$$

and, if below the Pigouvian tax, it decreases with the government’s openness to firm lobbying, $d\tau^*(\lambda)/d\lambda < 0$.

**Proof.** We first derive the marginal impact of a tax on welfare, and then use this to pin down the equilibrium tax rate. By consumer optimization, marginal utility equals price, $\partial V/\partial x_i = p_i(\tau)$, and, by A3 from the GLM, $\partial C_i/\partial x_i = k_i(\tau)$. Using this, differentiation of the welfare function yields:

$$\frac{dW(\tau)}{d\tau} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{p_i(\tau)}{[\rho_i(\tau) - 1]} + (\tau - D'(E(\tau)) \frac{dE(\tau)}{d\tau}).$$

A4 $x_i(\tau) = \psi_i[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]$ implies that $\frac{dx_i(\tau)}{d\tau} = \psi_i[\rho_i(\tau) - 1] z_i(0)$ since $\frac{dk_i(\tau)}{d\tau} = z_i(0)$ (as firms’ emissions intensities are assumed constant, with $z_i(\tau) = z_i(0)$). Since also $e_i(\tau) = z_i(0) x_i(\tau)$, this leads to a welfare impact:

$$\frac{dW(\tau)}{d\tau} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i(\tau)[\rho_i(\tau) - 1] + (\tau - D'(E(\tau)) \frac{dE(\tau)}{d\tau}).$$

The profit impact follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1(a):

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{d\Pi_i(\tau)}{d\tau} = 2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i(\tau)[\rho_i(\tau) - 1],$$

Putting these parts together in the first-order condition from (9) shows that $\tau^*(\lambda) > 0$ is determined by:

$$\left. \frac{dU_{gov}(\tau)}{d\tau} \right|_{\tau = \tau^*(\lambda)} = \left[ (1 + 2\lambda) \sum_{i=1}^{n} e_i(\tau)[\rho_i(\tau) - 1] + (\tau - D'(E(\tau)) \frac{dE(\tau)}{d\tau}) \right]_{\tau = \tau^*(\lambda)} = 0.$$

Defining the the tax elasticity of industry emissions $\eta \equiv [dE(\tau)/E(\tau)]/[d\tau/\tau] < 0$ and some rearranging gives the expression for $\tau^*(\lambda)$ in the proposition. The further claims on the properties of $\tau^*(\lambda)$ follow by inspection. ■

Proposition 2 shows how the distortion of the equilibrium tax $\tau^*(\lambda)$ away from the Pigouvian rule $\tau = D'$ is driven by the weighted average pass-through rate across regulated firms, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_i(\tau)}{E(\tau)} [1 - \rho_i(\tau)]$, with weights given by each firm’s share in the tax base.

To understand the result, note that in the Buchanan second-best problem, industry profits effectively measures the extent of the market-power distortion while in the Grossman-Helpman lobbying problem, industry profits drive the incentive to make political contributions. Our earlier result from Proposition 1 told us that, in the GLM
class of models, firm-level pass-through pins down firm-level profit impacts—and so the industry-level analog is driven by a weighted average of pass-through rates across firms.

Intuitively, lower pass-through means that a firm contracts output more strongly, creating greater deadweight losses and suffering larger profit losses, thus pushing $\tau^{\star}(\lambda)$ downwards—more strongly for large high-emissions firms. Relatedly, where the government is more open to lobbying, and the industry is opposed to the regulation, then this pushes the political equilibrium tax downwards.\footnote{Under perfect competition, each firms’ pass-through is 100% so the Pigouvian rule $\tau = D'$ applies—and there is no political lobbying (even if $\lambda > 0$) since no firm is making any profit.}

Proposition 2 shows how the impact of the Grossman-Helpman lobbying effect ($\lambda > 0$) is, in fact, driven by exactly the same forces as those underlying the Buchanan market-power effect. It also generalizes existing analysis of second-best emissions taxes ($\lambda = 0$) to all models consistent with the GLM, and clarifies the underlying economic intuition in terms of pass-through.

### 5.2 The political equilibrium carbon price for US airlines

We now estimate the political equilibrium carbon price for US airlines. More precisely, we consider a domestic US policymaker chooses her utility-maximizing level of complete regulation for all US airlines, of cognizant of the presence of market power in the airline market and under influence of political lobbying by airlines.

We make the result from Proposition 2 operational in four steps. First, we assume a constant social cost of carbon of $D'(\cdot) = $50/tCO$_2$ (Nordhaus, 2017). Second, we use our previous estimates to obtain the industry-wide average pass-through rate across regulated firms, $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{q_i}{x_i} \right) \rho_i = 0.78$. As discussed above, this implies that industry profits fall significantly with a tighter carbon price. Third, for the lobbying parameter $\lambda$, we turn to the literature. Goldberg & Maggi (1999) were the first to empirically estimate this parameter, finding $\lambda = 0.02$ for the US. McCalman (2004) and Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubasoglu (2002) obtain similar results for Australia and Turkey respectively while Gawande & Bandyopadhyay (2000) find a much higher estimate of $\lambda = 0.5$. Based on these findings, we take $\lambda = 0.1$ as our baseline.

Fourth, analogously to our pass-through analysis, we estimate the carbon-tax elasticity of emissions $\eta$ by estimating the elasticity of industry-level carbon emissions $E_t$ with respect to historical fuel prices using the following specification:

$$\log(E_t) = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \eta_m \log(f_{t-m}) + X_t'\beta + \epsilon_t$$

(10)

where $f_t$ is the quarterly average of the spot fuel price, and $X_t$ are (emissions-weighted) averages of the same covariates used in our pass-through regressions. As each gallon of
jet fuel produces a constant 0.00957 tons of CO$_2$, the elasticity of carbon emissions with respect to fuel price is identical to its elasticity with respect to the carbon price.

For consistency, we again estimate this regression using our sample of continuously operated routes over 2002 to 2014 and allow for adjustment to take up to 4 quarters. We find an “equilibrium” elasticity of $\eta \equiv \sum_{m=0}^{3} \eta_m = -0.16$ (± 0.08). This confirms the intuition that a carbon price is successful at decreasing industry-wide emissions—but also that the elasticity is only modest. Our estimate is at the lower end of the the range of elasticities reported in Fukui & Miyoahi (2017). (See Appendix E for further details.)

Using these various baseline parameter values in the formula of Proposition 2 yields a baseline estimate of $\tau^\star = 18.87/\text{CO}_2$ for the political equilibrium carbon tax. This lies more than 60% below the standard Pigouvian tax set at the social cost of carbon ($D'(\cdot) = 50/\text{tCO}_2$). The gains from the lower equilibrium tax accrue to the large legacy carriers who have limited carbon cost pass-through. By contrast, our analysis suggests that Southwest would actually prefer the carbon tax to be set at the Pigouvian level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lobbying influence ($\lambda$)</th>
<th>Carbon-price elasticity of emissions ($\eta$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>$10.71$ (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$21.05$ (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$27.08$ (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>$9.26$ (96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$18.87$ (93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$24.81$ (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>$8.15$ (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$17.09$ (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$22.89$ (85%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>$6.00$ (89%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$13.33$ (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$18.57$ (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Estimates of the political equilibrium carbon price for US airlines, combining Buchanan (1969) market-power effect and Grossman-Helpman (1994) lobbying effect, with the social cost of carbon (SCC) set at $50/\text{tCO}_2$. The shares of the Buchanan effect in the difference between the SCC and political equilibrium carbon price given in parenthesis.

Table 6 shows sensitivity analysis for the value of $\tau^\star$ when varying the emissions elasticity $\eta$ and the lobbying parameter $\lambda$. Intuitively, when emissions are more responsive to the carbon price, this amplifies its environmental benefits—which pushes $\tau^\star$ up. As expected, greater government openness to lobbying pushes $\tau^\star$ down. For a range of parameter values, $\tau^\star$ is below half of the SCC.\(^{63}\)

\(^{63}\)It is worth stressing that that this “carbon shortfall” is not driven by concerns about the incompleteness of regulation where a carbon price set by one jurisdiction applies only to a subset of firms in an industry.
We now decompose this “shortfall” into the two underlying model drivers. The Buchanan market-power effect is logically prior in that it can exist without any political lobbying (i.e., where \( \lambda = 0 \)) but the reverse is not true in our setting—without any market power, there are no profits and hence nothing to lobby over and so the Grossman-Helpman effect is zero. Thus switching off the lobbying channel, we find \( \tau^\star(\lambda = 0) = 21.05/\text{tCO}_2 \). In our baseline estimate, we therefore attribute 93\% of the “shortfall” to market power and the remaining 7\% to lobbying, given the presence of market power. Table 6 again provides sensitivity analysis showing that, for a range of parameter values, the share of the Buchanan effect typically exceeds 80\%.

In sum, this analysis suggests that the political economy for industries with strong product differentiation may be very different from well-researched sectors such as electricity and cement. They may also help explain why aviation has, so far, been a climate laggard. Looking ahead, they also suggest that policies to address market power may be able to complement policies to address environmental externalities.

6 Conclusion

This paper has made theoretical and empirical contributions. We have developed the GLM—a new, simple, flexible reduced-form model of imperfect competition that nests many existing oligopoly models as special cases. We showed that, within the GLM, firm-specific cost pass-through is a sufficient statistic for the profit impact of regulation on individual firms. Compared with the existing pass-through literature, the GLM allows near-arbitrary firm heterogeneity, does not require additional information on conduct parameters or mark-ups—but relies heavily on supply linearity.

We have presented empirical estimates of the impacts of (future) carbon pricing for US airlines. We found large intra-industry heterogeneity in pass-through between legacy and low-cost carriers, driven by differences in product portfolios, cost structures and consumer demand. We therefore expect these carrier types to have very different incentives to embrace climate regulation. Our estimates show significant pass-through heterogeneity even for a cost shock that hits all firms equally. The “political equilibrium” carbon price suggests that the combination of market power and lobbying influence can explain why aviation has been a climate laggard.

We hope that the GLM will also prove useful in other contexts in industrial organization, public economics, international trade, and networks. In this paper, we have shown its value in radically simplifying incidence analysis. More broadly, the GLM lends itself to large-scale estimation for industries characterized by complex inter-firm heterogeneity in terms of demand, costs and conduct. Relative to widely-used structural empirical modeling, its comparative advantage lies in lower complexity and greater transparency in addressing a narrower range of questions.
Appendix A  Extensions to the GLM

We here present two theoretical extensions of the GLM. The first extension is a simple model of oligopolistic second-degree price discrimination in which customers who buy earlier pay less. The second extension presents an alternative abatement technology involving \textit{ex post} clean up following production. In both of these settings, our main result from Proposition 1 on firm-specific cost pass-through as a sufficient statistic is preserved.

A.1 Oligopolistic price discrimination

In practice, consumers often pay different prices for the same good; for example, airlines price discriminate by selling same-class tickets at different prices depending on how far in advance a customer buys. Building on Hazledine (2006), we here show how Proposition 1 extends to a linear-symmetric Cournot oligopoly with price dispersion.

Consumers have unit demand for a homogeneous product (e.g., an economy flight from A to B), with a distribution of $V = 1 - X$ (so $X$th keenest consumer has value $1 - X$). There are $H$ price buckets where class $h$ is priced at $p_h = 1 - X_1 - X_2 - \ldots - X_h$, where $X_h$ is the number of units sold in class $h$. Each firm $i$ chooses how much of each price bucket to supply $\{x_{ih}\}_{h=1}^H$. Suppose that A1–A3 from the GLM are met, and for simplicity assume that marginal costs $k(\tau) = c(\tau) + \tau z(\tau)$ are symmetric across firms.

Firm $i$’s profits $\Pi_i = \sum_{h=1}^H \Pi_{ih} = \sum_{h=1}^H [p_h - k(\tau)]x_{ih}$ so again defining the profit-neutrality factor via $\Delta \Pi_i(\tau) = -\gamma_i \tau e_i(0)$, it follows that:

$$
\gamma_i(\tau) = \frac{-\Delta \Pi_i(\tau)}{\tau z(0)x_i(0)} \implies \gamma_i(0) = \frac{1}{z(0)x_i(0)} \left( -\sum_{h=1}^H \frac{d \Pi_{ih}(\tau)}{d \tau} \right|_{\tau=0},
$$

where $x_i \equiv \sum_{h=1}^H x_{ih}$ and we again focus on the “small $\tau$” case $\gamma_i(0)$.

Using results from Hazledine (2006, eq 11 & 13), it is easy to check that A4 is met for each price bucket in the symmetric Nash equilibrium, that is, $(p_k - c) = \phi_h x_{ih}$ where $\phi_h = (N^H + \ldots + N + 1)/N^h$. So we have that

$$
\sum_{h=1}^H \frac{d \Pi_{ih}(\tau)}{d \tau} \bigg|_{\tau=0} = 2 \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{1}{\phi_h} [p_h - k(0)] \left[ \frac{dp_h}{d \tau} - \frac{dk}{d \tau} \right]_{\tau=0} = 2z(0)x_i(0)\sum_{h=1}^H \frac{x_{ih}(0)}{x_i(0)} (\rho_h - 1),
$$

where $dk/d\tau|_{\tau=0} = z(0)$, again by A2 and A3, and $\rho_h \equiv (dp_h/d\tau)/(dk/d\tau)$ is the pass-through rate for price bucket $h$. This means that the profit-neutrality factor can be written as:

$$
\gamma_i(0; H) = 2 \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{x_{ih}(0)}{x_i(0)} (1 - \rho_h) = 2[1 - \rho_{ave}(H)],
$$

where $\rho_{ave}(H) \equiv \sum_{h=1}^H \frac{x_{ih}(0)}{x_i(0)} \rho_h$ is the average pass-through rate across the $H$ price buckets.
Hazledine (2006, Proposition 2) shows that price discrimination does not affect the average price paid by consumers, that is, \( \sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{X_h}{X} p_h = p_{ave}(H) = p_{ave}(1) \) for all \( H \), where \( p_{ave}(1) \) is the standard case of a uniform (single-bucket) price. This implies that
\[
\frac{d}{d\tau}p_{ave}(H) = \frac{d}{d\tau}\sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{X_h}{X} p_h = \frac{d}{d\tau}p_{ave}(1) \text{ for all } H.
\]

Finally, the linear model structure implies that \( \frac{d}{d\tau} \left( \frac{X_h(\tau)}{X(\tau)} \right) = 0 \), that is, higher cost decreases in equal proportion the output of each price bucket, so the ratio between output of bucket \( h \) and total output across all \( H \) buckets remains unchanged. Combining these findings shows that:
\[
\frac{d}{d\tau}p_{ave}(H) = \frac{d}{d\tau}\sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{X_h}{X} p_h = \frac{d}{d\tau}\sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{X_h}{X} \rho_h = z(0)\sum_{h=1}^{H} \frac{X_h}{X} \rho_h = z(0)\rho_{ave}(H) = z(0)\rho_{ave}(1) = \frac{d}{d\tau}p_{ave}(1) \text{ for all } H,
\]
which uses firm symmetry \( x_{ih}/x_i = X_h/X \). We conclude that:
\[
\gamma_i(0; H) = 2[1 - \rho_{ave}(H)] = 2[1 - \rho_{ave}(1)] = \gamma_i(0; 1) \equiv \gamma_i(0) \text{ for all } H,
\]
so that irrespective of the number of price buckets, it is the average pass-through that drives the profit impact. As in uniform-price model, a substantive restriction is that the number of firms \( n \) does not vary with \( \tau \); in addition, this here also holds for the number of price buckets \( H \).

Price discrimination here raises (lowers) the prices paid by high-value (low-value) consumers but leaves the average price unchanged.\(^{64}\) This benefits firms because sales expand (to otherwise excluded low-value consumers) while the average profit margin is unchanged. Conversely, cost pass-through to high-value (low-value) consumers declines (rises) but on average is unchanged as the number of price buckets changes.

### A.2 End-of-pipe emissions abatement

We here show that the result of Proposition 1 also holds if firm \( i \) instead has access to an “end-of-pipe” abatement technology. In the case of climate policy, this could be carbon capture and storage (CCS)—which has the potential to be applied in power generation as well as a range of industrial sectors. Other examples of end-of-pipe technologies are scrubbers on smokestacks, catalytic converters for cars, and various technologies for the treatment of industrial waste water.

Formally, we replace A2–A3 with the following alternative assumptions:

**A2’. (Cost-minimizing emissions)** Firm \( i \) chooses its inputs, including emissions \( e_i \), op-

\(^{64}\)A rough intuition is that firms view the problem in two steps: first, choosing an aggregate level of output—and hence average price, and, second, choosing how to vary output by bucket—and hence the set of discriminatory prices.
timally so as to minimize its total costs $C_i(x_i, e_i) + \tau e_i + \phi_i(z_i x_i - e_j)$ of producing output $x_i$, where $z_i \equiv z_i(0)$ is its fixed emissions intensity (emissions per unit of output) and the investment cost of the end-of-pipe technology satisfies $\phi'_i(\cdot), \phi''_i(\cdot) > 0$ with $\phi_i(0) = \phi'_i(0) = 0$.

A3’. (Constant returns to scale) Firm $i$’s optimized total costs at an emissions price $\tau$ are affine in output $C_i(x_i, e_i) + \tau e_i = k_i(0) x_i + \phi_i(z_i x_i - e_i)$, with unit cost $k_i(0) = c_i(0) + \tau z_i$.

The emissions intensity of production remains fixed at $z_i$ but, following production, the firm can clean up some or all of the resulting emissions at a fixed cost. Firm $i$’s optimal choice of emissions satisfies $\partial \Pi_i / \partial e_i = -\tau + \phi'_i = 0$ and so $e_i = z_i x_i - \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau)$ for given $x_i$. Hence optimal profits can be written as:

$$\Pi_i = [p_i - c_i(0) - \tau z_i] x_i + \left[ \tau \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau) - \phi_i(\phi'^{-1}_i(\tau)) \right].$$

The optimal value $v_i(\tau) \geq 0$ of the end-of-pipe abatement technology has the following properties:

$$v'_i(\tau) = \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau) + \left[ \tau - \phi'_i(\phi'^{-1}_i(\tau)) \right] \frac{d}{d\tau} \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau) = \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau) \geq 0$$

$$v''_i(\tau) = \frac{d}{d\tau} \phi'^{-1}_i(\tau) = \frac{1}{\phi''_i(\phi'^{-1}_i(\tau))} > 0.$$  

Similar to the value of exercising an option, $v_i(\tau)$ is increasing and convex in the underlying source of variation—here the carbon price. End-of-pipe abatement has no effect on $i$’s product-market strategy; this is identical to the GLM above, given unit cost $k_i(0) = c_i(0) + \tau z_i$.

For a small carbon price, $v'_i(0) = 0$ because $\phi'_i(0) = 0$; the optimal value of the abatement technology is of second order—and hence Proposition 1(a) applies for small $\tau$.

Of course, changes in the abatement technologies available to $j$’s rivals can alter $i$’s own profit impact; again, the point is that, given A1, A2’, A3’, A4, any such differences will be appropriately reflected in $i$’s own pass-through rate.

### Appendix B  Construction of airline data

**Ticket price** $p_{ijt}$ we obtain from cleaned DB1A provided by Severin Borenstein. We drop any non-direct tickets for $ijt$, and then convert the nominal prices to real 2014Q4 USD using St. Louis Fed CPI data (as we do with all monetary variables).

**Per-passenger fuel cost** $k_{ijt}$ is constructed as follows, with the raw variable names given parentheses. First we use the Form 41 (Schedule P-5.2) dataset, which contains carrier-aircraft-time specific fuel costs (fuel_fly_ops), which we denote $k_{dit}$. Following
O’Kelly (2012), we assume the fuel used to fly route $j$ is a linear function of distance $d_j$ with a non-zero intercept: $k_{ij} = b_{0l}^{it} + b_{1l}^{it} d_{ij}$. The fixed cost comes from the fuel used in take-off and landing, and any airport related activities; the variable cost is the ‘miles per gallon’ fuel consumption at cruising altitude. The fuel use data we have do not allow us to identify both the slope and the intercept, so we use an average value for their ratio taken from EEA (2016). Hence we set the ratio $b_{0l}^{it}/b_{1l}^{it} = 131$ for all $ilt$, meaning take off and landing uses the same fuel as cruising 131 miles.

Next we use the T-100 Domestic Segment to assign aircraft to routes. We construct the share $\alpha_{ijt}(l)$ of carrier $i$’s passengers on route $j$ at time $t$ that travelled on aircraft type $l$ (aircraft_type). We use total effective distances flown by each aircraft type $l$ on each route $j$, $\bar{d}_{ijt} = (\frac{p_{ij}^{t}}{\sum_{l} \alpha_{ijt}(l)} + \text{distance}_j) \times \text{dep}\_\text{performed}_{ijt}$, so that $\alpha_{ijt}(l) = \frac{\bar{d}_{ijt}}{\sum_{l} \bar{d}_{ijt}}$. Using these shares we construct the weighted average fuel cost $k_{ijt} = \sum_{l} \alpha_{ijt}(l) k_{ilt}$.

**Labour and maintenance cost index** $c_{jt}$ is constructed from Form 41 (Schedule P-5.2). We take, for each $ilt$, total flying operating costs (tot_fly_ops) plus total maintenance costs (tot_dir_maint) minus fuel costs (fuel_fly_ops). We then constructed a weighted average value for each $ijt$ using the weights $\alpha_{ijt}(l)$ described above. Finally, we transform the carrier-route-time specific costs (which could be subject to endogeneity via their denominator), into a carrier-time index of costs. This is done by dividing total costs by total passengers, for each carrier-time. We normalise to the 2000Q1 value for American Airlines.

**GDP growth** $g_{jt}$ is constructed with data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We take state GDP data, and then for each route $j$ we take the average of the state in which the each of the origin and destination airports are located. For the period 2002-2004 we interpolated the annual data as quarterly data is not available.

**Number of competitor firms** $n_{jt}$ we construct from the DB1A data. We define competitors to include all routes that serve the same city-city market as route $j$. For example LAX-SLC is a competitor product to SNA-SLC because LAX and SNA both serve the city of Los Angeles. We use the Bureau of Transportation Statistic’s ‘City Market ID’ to define city markets. Using the dataset’s city market IDs (origin_city_market_id and dest_city_market_id), we create a market route ID, and count all carriers serving that market with at least 1,000 passengers in a quarter.\(^{65}\)

**Number of potential entrants** $n_{pjt}$ is constructed from the DB1A. Using the above city market IDs, we count the number of carriers operating from each end of route $j$ at time $t$, and subtract the number of carriers operating a direct service on that market route. This gives $n_{pjt}$.

\(^{65}\)This would appear as pax_i99, since the dataset is a 10% sample.
Appendix C  Empirical results

C.1 Regression result for a single route

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PHX-SAT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southwest</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pass through</td>
<td>1.38***</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. firms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(3.26)</td>
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<td>No. potential entrants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour &amp; maintenance cost index</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(99.12)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Quarter 2</td>
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<td>Quarter 3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(17.20)</td>
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<td>No. of observations</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

Table 7: Regression results for Southwest’s PHX-SAT service for the period 2002Q1–2014Q4. The dependent variable is price.

In the first stage of the 2SLS estimation, the F-statistics for each of the four lags of the endogenous fuel cost are 57, 40, 86, 213 respectively. The four Sanderson-Windmeijer chi-squared Wald statistics lie in the range 83-225, suggesting no underidentification. The four Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistics are in the range 11.4-31.2, suggesting the IV bias relative to OLS is likely to be small. These results are not surprising, given the strong correlation between airlines’ fuel costs and spot fuel prices summarised in Figure 2a.

The second stage regression is reported in Table 7. It is not important that the individual coefficients on each of the lagged fuel costs are not significantly different to 0; what matters is that the equilibrium pass-through $\rho_{ij} = \sum_{m=1}^{3} \rho^{m}_{ij}$ is statistically different to 0, with a p-value of 0.0000. Significance levels for the covariates are generally quite
low, but this is to be expected given the small number of observations and relatively large number of regressors. As shown in Table 8, when we move to the Mean Group estimates, the significance levels rise dramatically. The coefficients all have the signs we would expect, with the exception $n$, which has very little variation for this route (see Figure 2).

### C.2 Mean Group baseline estimate: further results

Table 8 gives the Mean Group estimates of the coefficients in the baseline specification (7). The signs of the coefficients are all as expected, and the results are generally highly significant.

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<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pass-through</td>
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<td>0.55***</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>GDP growth</td>
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<td>(18.44)</td>
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<td>-7.08***</td>
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<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
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<td>-1.13**</td>
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<td>(0.42)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labour and maintenance cost index</td>
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<td>97.88***</td>
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<td>(8.69)</td>
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<td>-7.97***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter 2</td>
<td>4.32***</td>
<td>10.94***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter 3</td>
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<td>No. obs.</td>
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<td>20,956</td>
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</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Covariate coefficients from Mean Group estimation of baseline specification (7) for 2002Q1–2014Q4. The dependent variable is price.
Table 9: Average (unweighted) prices, per-passenger costs and other characteristics for the carrier-routes in our sample, over 2002Q1–2014Q4. Passengers and revenue are averages over a year. WN = Southwest, AA = American Airlines, AS = Alaska Airlines, DL = Delta, HA = Hawaiian Airlines, UA = United Airlines, US = US Airways.

### Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WN</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>AS</th>
<th>DL</th>
<th>HA</th>
<th>UA</th>
<th>US</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Price ($)</strong></td>
<td>157.31</td>
<td>226.29</td>
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<td>230.86</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fuel cost ($)</strong></td>
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<td>43.36</td>
<td>47.20</td>
<td>41.54</td>
<td>55.32</td>
<td>42.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance (miles)</strong></td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1,163</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emissions (tCO₂)</strong></td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Passengers (000s)</strong></td>
<td>195</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. firms</strong></td>
<td>3.28</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>4.65</td>
<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fraction seats filled</strong></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue ($ million)</strong></td>
<td>24.76</td>
<td>31.46</td>
<td>24.82</td>
<td>29.36</td>
<td>35.12</td>
<td>29.46</td>
<td>24.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenue in sample</strong></td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. routes</strong></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No. observations</strong></td>
<td>11,024</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>4,680</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>5,252</td>
<td>2,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**C.3 Results for all airlines**

Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics by individual carrier. There is heterogeneity within the legacy carriers, with Alaska and Hawaiian in particular flying shorter and therefore cheaper routes. This is can be explained by their emphasis on services within the US’s two particularly remote States, combined with services from the mainland US to these states. These airline are a small fraction of the total legacy portfolio, however, and the four largest legacy carriers are markedly more homogenous. And despite these two somewhat anomalous small legacy carrier, Southwest is still the outlier compared to all other carriers.

Table 10 shows the carrier average pass-through rates, broken down by carrier within the legacy group. Southwest’s pass-through is significantly above 1 by a considerable margin, whereas all the legacy carriers have a pass-through point estimate below 1. There is, however, considerable variation within the group. At the lower end, United’s pass-through has a negative point estimate, but it is not statistically significantly different from 0. At the upper end, American, Hawaiian and US Airways all have pass-through rates that are not significantly different from 1 at 5%. Nonetheless, Southwest clearly remains significantly different to the legacy carriers, whose pass-through rates can plausibly be claimed to likely lie in the interval (0, 1).

### Appendix D  Further results and robustness

In this section, we report regression results for a slightly modified or extended specifications, or for the baseline specification estimated using subsets of the full sample. Our purpose is to show some further results indicative of factors important to pass through, and to show that the numerical results reported in Section 4 are robust to the relevant alternative setups.

#### D.1 Estimates using OLS

For completeness and to provide a benchmark, we report the results of estimating equation (7) using OLS, rather than the baseline 2SLS approach described in Section 4. The result, reported in Table 11, is pass-through rates of 1.34 and 0.43 for Southwest and the legacy carriers respectively. This is suggestive of some common downward bias in OLS, but also confirms that our instruments are not driving the difference between the two airline types.

#### D.2 Time

We re-estimate our baseline 2SLS results for a later, and smaller, 10 year time window: 2005Q1-2014Q4. As shown in Table 11, the number of continuously operated routes is slightly larger, but the pass-through rates are statistically unchanged from the full period results, suggesting our choice of time window (which includes both good times and bad for US airlines) is not driving the results.

#### D.3 Entry and exit

When estimating pass-through rates using variation over time, we implicitly require market structure to be stable over time. In reality, however, there is considerable exit and entry on many routes over the period of our sample, which could correlate with fuel cost.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Baseline (2SLS)</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) OLS</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Late period: 2005-2014 only</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>229</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) n-interaction</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Baseline with $\Delta n = 0$</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(f) Baseline with $\Delta n \leq 1$</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(g) Fixed effects specification</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(h) Log specification</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, number of routes in italics.

Table 11: Pass-through rates for subsets of the full results, alternative estimations of equation (7), or alternative specifications. Quantities in parentheses are standard errors and in italics are the number of routes in the estimation.
This was our motivation for including both number of rivals and number of potential entrants in all our regressions, such that any effects on the level of the price are controlled for. However, we here explore whether entry and exit may be an issue in two further ways.

First, we allow the pass-through rate to be a linear function of the number of competitors. We take a simple approach, which we repeat several variants of below, by including an interaction between a variable of interest \( v_{ijt} \) and the fuel cost, \( k_{ijt} \), so that the regression equation becomes:

\[
p_{ijt} = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \rho_{ij}^m k_{ij,t-m} + \sum_{m=0}^{3} \phi_{ij}^m k_{ij,t-m} \cdot v_{ij,t-m} + X'_{ijt} \beta_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt}
\] (11)

The equilibrium rate of pass-through is now \( \rho_{ij} = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \rho_{ij}^m + \sum_{m=0}^{3} \phi_{ij}^m \cdot v_{ij} \). We can test whether the variable \( v \) impacts the pass-through rate by looking at the statistical significance of \( \phi_{ij} = \sum_{m=0}^{3} \phi_{ij}^m \).

To test whether entry impacts on the pass-through, we set \( v_{ijt} = n_{ijt} \), the number of firms operating on a route, and evaluate the pass-through rate in 2014 using \( n_{ij,t=2014} \), the average number of competitor firms in 2014. The resulting pass-through rates, shown in Table 11 row (d), are stastically indistinguishable from the baseline case. Table 12 row (a) shows the value of the interaction coefficient, which is not statistically different from zero.

The second way we explore the impact of entry and exit is to recalculate average pass-through rates, but only for subsets of routes that see zero or little entry and exit over the period. The results are shown in Table 11 rows (e) and (f), and demonstrate a reasonably stable pass-through rate for the different types of route. We would not expect these to be identical; the \( \Delta n = 0 \) routes, for example, are all monopolies. We consider this more of a check that the results don’t appear to be being driven by routes with either particularly stable or unstable numbers of competitors. Southwest’s pass-through rates are very stable across the different subsets, and statistically indistinguishable. The legacy carriers are also statistically indistinguishable at 10%, though not at 5%. Similar results are obtained when looking at stability in the number of potential entrants, \( n^p \).

**D.4 Southwest presence**

Goolsbee & Syverson (2008), among others, stress the importance of competition with Southwest being a major factor in the pricing decisions of the legacy carriers. We explore this issue by asking whether Southwest’s presence, actual or potential, may affect not just the level of the legacy carriers’ prices but their pass-through as well. To do this, we first set the interaction variable \( v_{ijt} \) in specification (11) equal to a dummy equal to 1 if Southwest competes with route \( j \) in time \( t \). Clearly when there is no variation in
Southwest’s presence over time this effect will not be identified, so the coefficient \( \phi \) will be capturing the impact of entry (or exit, but this is less common) by Southwest on the legacy carrier’s pass-through. The result in row (d) of Table 12 indicates that Southwest’s presence as a competitor statistically significantly reduces the legacy carriers’ pass-through rates.

In row (e) of Table 12 we show the result of including an additional interaction term in specification (11), a dummy equal to 1 if Southwest is a potential entrant on route \( j \) (using the definition from Goolsbee & Syverson 2008, and described in detail above). The results suggest that once Southwest has entered a route, its presence has no statistically significant effect on pass-through. However, potential entry by Southwest has a significant and highly negative effect on the pass-through rate. This result compliments and reinforces the findings in Goolsbee & Syverson (2008), suggesting that, separate to a level effect on prices, the threat of entry by Southwest heavily constrains the ability of legacy carriers to pass through cost rises to their customers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) No. firms ( n )</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>183</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Volatility</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>212</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Bankruptcy dummy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Southwest present dummy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e) Southwest present dummy</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest potential</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, number of routes in italics.

Table 12: Mean Group estimates of interaction coefficient \( \phi \) of cost with another variable of interest, using specification (11).
D.5 Asymmetric pass-through

Consumers and regulators often suspect that prices rise faster and further after an increase in firm costs than they fall after a fall in costs, a phenomenon known as “rockets and feathers”. We test for the presence of asymmetric pass-through by setting the interaction variable $v_{ijt}$ in specification (11) equal to a dummy variable equal to 1 if $p_{ijt} > p_{ij,t-1}$, and equal to 0 otherwise. Following Peltzman (2000), we also run the regression in first differences rather than levels. We find the equilibrium coefficient on the interaction term is significantly different (at 5%) from 0 on 9.9% of carrier-routes, with no considerable difference between between Southwest (8.0%) and the legacy carriers (10.9%). Hence, the assumption of symmetric cost pass-through seems to generally hold for airlines in this setting. This puts air travel in the minority: Peltzman (2000) found more than two thirds of a broad range of goods exhibit asymmetric cost pass-through.

D.6 Fuel price volatility

In a different but related setting, Kellogg (2014) finds that expected future oil price volatility has a significant impact on oil drilling investments in Texas, with firms investing less when volatility is high. Though the mechanism would differ, it is possible that airlines’ pass-through may also be affected by input cost volatility. This could have important consequences for profits since an emissions trading scheme would lead to carbon price volatility whereas a carbon tax would not.

To test the impact of fuel price volatility, we set the interaction term $v_{ijt}$ in specification (11) equal to simple measure of volatility, the standard deviation, over the quarter, of daily jet fuel prices. The results, shown in row (b) of Table 12, show that input cost volatility significantly and negatively affects the ability of firms to pass through costs. Though the coefficient is higher for Southwest, the proportional effect on the overall pass-through rate is lower, because Southwest pass-through rates are larger. This is, to our knowledge, a new result, which suggests that an emissions trading scheme could have a more negative impact on profits than a carbon tax at the same average level.

D.7 Bankruptcy

Most of the legacy carriers in our sample went through periods of bankruptcy over the period we study: American in 2011-13, Delta in 2005-07, United in 2002-06 and US in 2002-03 and 2004-05. (Southwest was not bankrupt at any point.) To see whether this has an effect on pass-through we set the interaction variable $v_{ijt}$ in specification (11) equal to a dummy equal to 1 if airline $j$ is bankrupt in quarter $t$. As shown in Table 12 row (c), the Mean Group estimate of the equilibrium coefficient $\phi$ on this interaction term is equal to 0.15 ($\pm$ 0.06). This suggests that pass-through rates are 0.15 higher for carriers
in periods of bankruptcy. This makes sense: carriers in financial distress may be less able to absorb cost rises, and they may be less willing to if they believe there is an chance they may shortly cease to exist.

D.8 Fixed effects estimation

As argued in Section 4, Mean Group and not Fixed Effects estimation is the correct approach in this setting, as it does not impose homogeneity restrictions on the pass-through rates of each airline’s different routes. A further important problem with a Fixed Effects specification in this setting would be assuming that the impact of the covariates would be the same for each route. In fact, the impact of, for example, higher GDP or a time dummy on price will be very different for a short route priced at $100 or a long route priced at $500. For completeness, we report the results of a fixed effects estimation of specification (7) in Table 11. Although the pass-through result for Southwest is a little lower than in the Mean Group case, our overall qualitative findings surprisingly similar in this miss-specification.

D.9 Log specification

Section 4 reports pass-through rates in levels. These are the relevant input for our theoretical results, and this is the standard approach in much of the pass-through literature. However, others areas of the literature, for example, on exchange rate pass-through, estimate pass-through elasticities. We therefore estimate a version of equation (7) using logs of price and fuel cost. The pass-throughs, reported in row (h) of Table 11, lie in the interval (0, 1), as expected for an elasticity measure. Without specifying the level of both price and total marginal cost, we cannot directly compare an elasticity pass-through with the levels pass-throughs in our baseline results. However, the logged results are reassuring in that once again we see a significantly larger pass-through for Southwest than the legacy carriers.

Appendix E Political economy empirical results

Table 13 shows the full regression results from estimating equation (10).

References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fuel price elasticity</td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. firms</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. potential entrants</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour &amp; maintenance cost index</td>
<td>-0.67**</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter 1</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter 2</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quarter 3</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>15.73***</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. observations: 52

Table 13: Regression results for estimating specification (10). The dependent variable is the log of total emissions; the elasticity is the sum of the four lags of the log of the fuel price.


Cui, Qiang, Yi-Ming Wei, Chen-lu Yu, Ye Li (2016). Measuring the Energy Efficiency for Airlines Under the Pressure of Being Included into the EU ETS. *Journal of Advanced Transportation* 44, 39–53.


